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ABSTRACT 
THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
STANDARDS: THE MARKET VALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LIABILITIES 
This thesis investigates the economic consequences of regulatory intervention on 
the fuiancial reporting of environmental liabilities. The regulatory intervention is the 
introduction of new financial reporting standards that relate to managers' and auditon' 
responsibilities in estixnating and reporting environmental liabilities. The research 
question is whether this regulatory intervention is associated with a change in the 
market's valuation of environmental iiability accruals reported in companies' financial 
statements. A change in the market's valuation can indicate that market participants 
perceive the environmental liability information to be more precisely measured when the 
new financial reporting standards corne into effect. 
The thesis draws on theory and pnor research to generate the testable hypothesis 
that, as one moves fiom a regime of low financial reporting standards for environmental 
liabilities to one of high financial reporting standards, the change in the valuation 
coefficient on a dollar of reported environmental liability will be negative. More 
specifically, the valuation coefficient is expected to change from zero, for an imprecise 
environrnental liability measure, to negative one for a precise measure. The research 
question is studied by using an interrupted tirne-senes design with replications in two 
settings, Canada and the US. The regulatory interventions occurred at different times in 
these two countries, 1995 in Canada and 1993 in the US. The impact of the intervention 
is measured by examining the behaviour of the valuation coefficient on reported 
environmental liabilities in a multiple linear regression of share pnce levels on 
environmental liability book values and 0 t h  relevant financial statement variables 
The empirical analyses indicate that the market places a negative valuation on 
environmental liabilities. Results for the US sample indicate that this coefficient becomes 
less negative after the regulatory change in 1993. The Canadian sample also indicates a 
change to a less negative coefficient, but this change is not significant when 1995 is used 
as the effective date of the regulatory change, while it is significant when 1993 is used. 
This suggests that the change in US standards aiso influenceci the companies in the 
Canadian sample, thus preempting the later change in Canadian standards. These 
empirical findings indicate that the change in the valuation coefficient is non-negative; 
this is opposite to the study's ex ante pndiction. The potential for reporting bias to be an 
ornitted factor that works in the opposite direction to the hypothesized precision effect is 
explored as one possible ex post interpretation of these hdings. 
The thesis presents evidence that changes in hancial reporting standards are 
associated with changes in the market valdon of environmental liabilities, contributing 
to our understanding of the role of financial reporting standards in the reporting and 
valuation of environmental liabilities. 
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CHAPTER t 
INTRODUCTION 
I .  1 Introduction 
This thesis investigates the economic consequences of regulatory intervention on the 
financial reporting of environmental liabilities. The regulatory intervention is the 
introduction of new financial reporthg standards' that relate to managers' and auditors' 
responsibilities in reporting environmental liability estimates. The research question is 
whether this regulatory intervention is associated with a change in the market's valuation 
of environmental liability amounts reported in companies' financial statements. A change 
in the market's valuation c m  indicate that market participants perceive the environmental 
liability information to be more precisely measured when the new financial reporting 
standards corne into effect. 
1.2 Motivation for the siudy 
Recent financial reporting standards address the precision of accounting information in 
ternis of its measurement uncertainty. These standards acknowledge that measurement 
uncertainty may Vary nom item to item in the financial statements, and over t h e  for the 
same item.' This thesis intends to contribute to our knowledge of the factors that relate to 
- - -  
' The t c n  'financial repocriag standards' is used in tbir papcr to refer to accounting, audithg and other 
regulatory standards that govern the reporting of fiaanciai information. 
' For example. CICA Handbook section 1508, Memurement uncenainïy, is the Caaadian accounting 
profession's acknowledgment that measuremcnt unccrtainty can Vary h m  item to item in the fuiancial 
accounting information precision in general, and more specifically to environmental 
liability estimates, which are characterized by a high level of measurement uncertainty. 
Pnor studies have addressed the quality of accounting information3, the accounting for 
environmental liabilities, and the role of standards in the financial reporting of 
environmental liabilities. This section outlines the existing research and the incremental 
contribution of this study. 
Lev (1 989) called for research into how investors adjust for differences in accounting 
information quality and how accounting measures and valuation techniques might be 
improved to affect the ability of financial information to help investors predict future cash 
flows. Along this line, Collins and Salatka (1993) and Bandyopadhyay (1995) addressed 
the impact of information precision on eamings response coefficients. Considering 
environrnental liabilities more specifically, Shane and Spicer (1983), Barth and 
McNichols (1994). Blacconiere and Patten (1994). and Blacconiere and Northcut (1997) 
found information about environrnental liabilities to be value relevant to investors. This 
study extends these lines of research by considering the effect of hancial reporting 
standards on the precision of environmental liability amounts reported in financial 
statements and the relation between these amounts and share prices. This shidy differs 
from prior environmental liability research in that it uses cornpanies' actual environmental 
liability accruals rather than proxies for these, or other environrnental information 
disclosures. This approach of using actual accruals c m  reduce the measurement problems 
staternents. Many reccnt accounting standards address the measurement of uncertain amounts (e-g. 
cmplayee stock options, post-retirement benefits, pension iiabilities, derivative fuiancial instruments and 
loan loss provisions). 
that arise kom using proxy measures, as pointed out by Holthausen (1994) in his 
discussion of Barth and McNichols (1994), and may provide results that can be 
interpreted with less ambiguity. This study differs fiom the prior earnings response 
research in that here the market's valuation of environmental liabilities is examined rather 
than an eamings response coefficient. 
Accounting information precision c m  also be considered in ternis of the trade-off 
between relevance and reliability, a fûndarnental problem in accounting that is discussed 
by Scott (1996) and others. Environmental liabilities provide an example of the dilemma 
facing accountants in attempting to provide relevant information. Costs of fuhue 
obligations to clean up past environmental darnages could have a very material impact on 
a company's financial position, but attempts to estimate these liabilities involve high 
levels of uncertainty conceming the amounts and timing of such costs and appropriate 
discounting methods (see Eckel and Nehlawi (1985) and Barth and McNichols (1994)). 
Accounting principles tend to favour reliability and require that information included in 
financial statements be reasonably estimable.* Thus, a problem exists in that relevant 
information may be omitted fkom financial statements because it is too dificult to 
estimate. 
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the assessrnent of what is a reasonable 
estimate is highly subjective. The accounting rules that apply to the reporthg of 
' In this snidy, and most of the pnor rcsearch cited here, information quality is considered only in tcmis of 
its precision (the inverse of  its variance). Information quality can have other aspects, but these an not the 
focus of the hypothcsis tcsted in this study. 
environmental liability estimates tend to leave considerable discretion to management. 
Prior research indicates that firms may be less likely to disclose unfavourable news (for 
exarnple, Clarkson, Kao and Richardson 1994; Scott 1994; Wiseman 1982; Ingram and 
Frazier 1980). Further, the theory of voluntary disclosure predicts that less disclosure of 
unfavourable information will occur the higher is information users' uncertainty about 
whether the firm has any information; a manager rnay even commit to obtaining no 
information so that no disclosure needs to be made @ye 1985; Verrecchia 1990; Li, 
Richardson and Thornton 1997). Since environmental liabilities are both unfavourable 
and uncertain, theory and pnor research indicate that fixms' disclosures of these items 
may be less than full and fair. 
Since the omission of significant liabilities would seriously impair the usefulness and 
credibility of financial statements, replators have recently provided new financial 
reporting standards relating to the reporting and auditing of environmental liability 
information. These new standards are M e r  discussed in chapter 2.' There are two 
notable implications of these new standards. First, the standards acknowledge that 
information with vatying degrees of measurement uncertainty rnay have to be included in 
order for financial statements to be fairly presented. Second, the standards make it clear 
that managers and auditors have a responsibility to consider the fair presentation of 
liabilities arising from environmental laws and regulations. Feroz, Park and Pastena 
(1991) and Stanny (1996) have studied the regulatory costs that such new standards 
impose on companies. This study considers whether these new financial reporting 
' For example, CICA Handôook sections 3060 (Capital assets) and 3290 (Contingencies), and FASB SFAS 
No.5 and Interpreta tioa No. 14 (Accounting for contingencies). 
standards are likely to result in more effort to reduce the uncertainty of environmental 
liability estimates, hence leading to more precise environmental liability arnounts being 
reported in financial statements. 
There has been considerable debate within the accounting/auditing profession regarding 
the roles and responsibilities of accountants and auditors in issues of environmental 
accountability (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 1992). Venfiability 
is essential to the credibility of financial statement information, including accounting 
estimates (Breeden 1994; Sharav 1995). The auditor's examination of  management's 
estimation process is a factor that may relate to the precision of accounting estimates 
(DeAnge10 1 98 1 ; Titman and Trueman 1986). Previous studies have considered the 
relation behveen auditor quality, often proxied by audit firm size, and share or bond 
prices (Beatty 1989; Teoh and Wong 1993; Raman and Wilson 1994). Abdohoharnmadi 
et al (1997) also draw attention to the need for research into the standard-setting process 
and the role of accountants and auditon in providing assurance regarding environmental 
accounting. The present study extends this prior research by considering the audit 
function as a component of the fuiancial reporting standards for environmental liability 
estimates. These standards are viewed as a factor that may be associated with accounting 
information precision. 
Finally, over tirne the arnount of environmental liability information companies provide 
has been increasing. This study adds to the existing research by providing a new set of 
ALo, detaikd descriptions of these standards are in Appendix 1. 
5 
hand-collected data about Canadian and Unitd States (US) companies' environmental 
liabilities. 
In sumary, this study is motivated by the need to understand the factors that relate to the 
precision of reported environmental liabilities, items that are characterized by a high level 
of meaçurement uncertainty. It considers one factor, financial reporting standards, that 
may have an impact on the effort that is applied to estimating the liability and hence the 
precision of the information. The study seeks evidence that market participants perceive 
the environmental liability information to be more precise when these new standards are 
in place. 
1.3 ûverview of the research question and design 
The research question is whether new financial reporting standards lead to changes in the 
market valuation of environmental liability accruals, changes that would be consistent 
with usea believing that this information is more precise. The event of interest in the 
study is a regulatory change, the introduction of new standards that increase managers' 
and auditon' responsibility to examine environmental liability estimates. Throughout the 
paper, this event is referred to as an 'increase in financial repoxting standards'. It is 
expected that this event will produce a regime shift from a period of lower effort in 
estimating environmental liabilities when the standards were lower, to one of higher 
effort when standards are higher, and that higher effort will produce more precise 
estimates. For the purpose of this study, the pre-change period (before the new standards 
came into effect) is referred to as the 'low standards' regime, and the post-change penod 
(after the new standards came into effect) is referred to as the 'high standards' regime. 
The study uses the relation between the market price and the reported environmental 
liability information as an indicator of the information's precision. This relation is 
investigated by using a regression mode1 design in which share price levels are regressed 
on book values of the environrnental liability and other value-relevant financial statement 
 variable^.^ The main prediction of the study is based on the expectation that, in this levels 
specification, there will be a one-to-one relation between book value and market price if 
the book value is very precise. This expected relation is provided by the valuation 
framework of Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and the empirical interprctations of the 
framework set out by Bernard (1995) and others. Thus, in the case of a 'perfect' 
environrnental liability measure, a valuation coefficient of negative one would be 
expected. 
Relying on the basic insight provided in Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988), chapter 3 
develops the theoretical prediction that the valuation coefficient of the environmental 
liability will be closer to negative one when financial reporting standards are higher, 
implying that market participants believe that more precise information has been 
produced under the higher standards. In contrast, if investors believe the estirnate is very 
imprecise, then the expected coefficient would be zero. Thus, the change in the valuation 
The other fmancial statement variables ustd are book values of assets and liabilities other than the 
environmental liability, and abnormal earnings, This is further cxplaincd in chapter 5.  
coefficient going from the low standards regime to the high standards regime is 
hypothesized to be negative (from zero to negative one). 
The main difficulties that must be overcorne in the levels regression research design are 
to identiS, and control for other factors that may be influencing share pnces, and to 
provide the conditions necessary to infer causation. As M e r  described in chapter 4, the 
research design is an intempted tirne senes with replications in two settings, Canada and 
the US. This experimental design can provide control against validity threats such as 
history and maturation. 
1.4 Organization of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the institutional 
background of financial reporting standards for environmental liabilities in Canada and 
the US. Chapter 3 reviews the pnor research on estimation effort, information precision 
and the pnce-to-book relation. Chapter 3 develops the theoretical prediction and the 
research hypothesis. Chapter 4 discusses the research design, the experimental 
manipulation, the potential outcornes resulting from the manipulation, and a quasi- 
experimental design that addresses inference validity concems. Chapter 5 describes the 
data collection method, the empirical mode1 and econometric specification issues. 
Chapter 6 presents the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Chapter 7 concludes 
the thesis and discusses its limitations and possible future research directions. 
CHAPTER 2 
INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND 
2. i Introduction 
This chapter outlines the institutional background of the study. Since both Canadian and 
US companies are included in the research design, the institutional backgrounds of both 
countries are relevant to the study. The chapter describes the financial reporting standards 
that relate to environmental liabilities. 
2.2 Financial reporting standards in Canada and the US 
In recent years environmental laws and social expectations in both couniries have 
increased the obligations of firms that pollute to incur present and fiiture costs to 
remediate their operating sites. A film's operations may generate future obligations to 
clean up or restore sites that it has polluted. In this paper these obligations are referred to 
as environmental liabilities. 
Fomerly, these clean-up costs were not required to be paid by polluting h s ;  they were 
extemalities in that the firm's impact on other users of the environment were not included 
in its costs. With social intolerance for environmental degradation increasing in recent 
years, govemments have introduced regulations to attempt to internalize some of the 
environrnental extemalities by forcing clean-up costs ont0 polluting firms. These laws 
create an obligation for a firm to give up resources in the future that arises from past 
events, thus meeting the accounting definition of a liability (for exarnple, CICA 
Handbook section 1000). 
Accounting standards require that significant known liabilities be included in the 
financial statements. However, environmental liabilities are subj ect to considerable 
uncertainty. This is because, for example, the regulatory enforcement may not be certain 
and the clean-up technologies are relatively new. Still, the extent of environrnental 
darnage would indicate that, for some firms, these liabilities could be large enough to 
have a significant impact on the firm's fuiancial position and future cash flows. 
In the accounting standards, the uncertainty conceming liabilities is considered to have 
two aspects: the uncertainty regarding whether or not a material liability will arise; and 
the uncertainty about the amount of the liability if it does in fact arise. This discussion of 
environrnental liabili ty accounting focuses only on the second of these two aspects, the 
measurement uncertainty conceming the amount of the liability. The view is taken here 
that al1 compaties will have sorne potential environmental liability and only its amount is 
uncertain. A very small, immaterial liability is considered the same as a liability of zero 
because the study is concerned with observable, reported information and imrnaterial 
liabilities may not be reported. 
Three accounting standards can be applied to this environmental liability situation in 
Canada: the recornmendations for accounting for contingent liabilities in Contingencies, 
CICA Handbook section 3290 (effective August 1978); the recommendations for 
accounting for site restoration costs in Capital assets, CICA section 3060 (effective 
December 1990); and the accounting recommendations for the measurement uncertainty 
aspect of environmental liabilities in Meusurement uncerrciinîy, CICA section 1508 
(effective July 1995).' These are further discussed below. 
CICA section 3290 defines a contingency as 'a situation involving uncertainty as to 
possible ... loss to an enterprise that will ultimately be resolved when one or more hiture 
events occur or fail to occur. Resolution of the uncertainty may c o n f h  the ... loss or 
impairment of an asset or the incurrence of a liability.' (CICA section 3290.02). The 
accounting required for a contingent liability depends on whether the probability range of 
uncertainty is 'likely', 'unlikely', or 'not determinable'. If likely, the liability should be 
accrued in the financiai statements, but only if the amount cm be 'reasonably estimated'. 
If the estimate of the amount is a range, accrue either the best estirnate in the range, or if 
no estimate is better than any other, accrue the minimum arnount in the range. If the 
contingent loss is likely but the amount is not 'reasonably estimable', or if a loss in excas 
of the accrueâ amount is possible, disclosure of the relevant facts should be made in the 
financiai statement notes. If the likelihood is not determinable, and a contingent loss 
would be material if it occurred, disclosure of the relevant facts should be made in the 
' The standards discussed here arc recommen&tions of the Canadian Institute of Chartercd Accountants. 
US requirements, primariiy FASB's SFAS NOS and Interpretation No. 14, are similar. Further details of the 
Canadian and US standards are provided in Appendix 1. 
financial statement notes. By implication, if the contingent toss is 'not likely' no 
disclosure or accrual is required.' 
CICA section 3060 concems capital assets and specifically addresses hture site 
restoration costs. It requires that these be provided for when 'reasonably estimable', in a 
rational and systematic manner by charges to income (CICA section 3060.39). 
CICA section 1508 addresses the measurement uncertainty aspect of environmental 
liabilities. Measurement uncertainty exists when there is a difference between an amount 
recognized in the financial statements and another reasonably possible amount. The 
nature of a material measurement uncertainty should be disclosed, and its extent should 
be disclosed when it is reasonably possible that the recognized amount could change by a 
material amount within the next year (CICA sections 1508.06 and .07). When such 
disclosures are made, the amount recognized should also be disclosed unless it would 
have an adverse effect on the enterprise. 
Financial statements issued for public use must be audited. The stated pwpose of an 
independent financial statement audit is for the auditor to gather and evaluate evidence so 
as to form an opinion on whether the financial statements are fairly stated (for example, 
CICA Handbook section 5 100). Auditors historically took the position that they were not 
responsible [or financial presentation of liabilities arising from laws other than incorne 
~n Exposure Draft (ED) of a revised set of rccommcndations for contingencies was issucd by the CICA 
in Febmary 1993. The main change b the ED was to specifjt the probability range dcfinitions as rnutuaiiy 
excIusive ranges. The ED was withdrawu in 1996, but while it was outstanding it rnay have had an 
and commodity tax lawse9 With the rise of social concems and regulation regarding 
environmental problems, the standard setters that regulate auditors' activities have 
intervened in this status quo, as described below. 
In Canada, the auditing profession is regulated by the CICA. Two new CICA Handbook 
audi ting standards, section 5 1 36: Misstatements-Illegal acts and Audit Guideline 1 9: 
A udii of financial staternents a ffected by environmenial matters, were inîroduced in 
1995'O. Arnong other things, these new standards expanded the auditor's responsibility to 
consider environrnental matters and, in particular, the auditor's responsibility to search 
for violations of environrnental laws that would give nse to liabilities. The standards 
require auditors to consider environmental risks when planning an audit, to make 
enquiries of management and to obtain managers' written representations concerning 
violations of environmental laws that would give nse to liabilities. Auditon' expressed 
concems at the introduction of these standards provide evidence that the standards were 
viewed as risk increasing by many memben of the auditing profession (Munisalu 1995)." 
influence on some companics' accounting methods. Notably, the ED was more similar to the US standard 
FAS NOS than is the current s.3290. 
This viewpoint was provided by a senior partner in a large Canadian accounting fum. This view is 
consistent with the absence of auditing standards relating to legal matters prior to the issue of CICA section 
5 136, Misstatements - Illegal AC& in 1995, and with auditors' objection letters in response to the Exposure 
Draa for CICA s.5 136 (Murusalu 1995). 
'O An eariier version of this Audit Guideline was available in 1994 but in 1995 this was rcvised and 
reissued to be linked to the Handbook section 5 136. A Handbook section is authoritative, while an Audit 
Guideiine is only advisory. Therefore, in this study 1995 is considered to be the cfftctive date of the new 
standards for Canada. Howcver, the effcct may have begun earlier or later for some companies. For both 
Canada and the US, it is difiicult to pinpoint an effective date for this type of process-oriented fhancial 
reporting standard; this is a limitation of thc study. 
" In her sumrnary of responses to the exposure draft of the CICA s.5136 material, Muxusalu (1995) reports 
that respondents were concemd that the illegal acts standard would increase the auditors' exposurt to legal 
liability. Some respondents suggested the standards shouid limit the auditor's responsibility only to those 
laws and regulations that have a direct and material effcct on the dctennination of frnanciai statcment 
arnounts, such as certain provisions of the Incorne Tax Act. Rcspondents expressed the view that auditors 
should not be responsible for identifying and designing audit procedures for other types of laws, such as 
environmental laws. 
Investors would also have been aware of these new standards through reports in the 
business press (for example, St. Onge 1994). 
In the US, the Arnerican Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) sets auditing 
standards. Two regulatory events in the US would have had an impact on auditon' 
activities similar to that of the Canadian events noted above. First, in 1988 the NCPA 
issued the Statement on Auditing Standards no. 54: Illegal Acts by Clients. This standard 
directly required auditors to consider a client's cornpliance with laws and regulations, 
such as environmental laws, dunng an audit. Second, in 1993, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Stafl Accounting Bulletin No. 92, a document that 
clarified the Commission's expectations regarding the financial reporting of 
environmental liabilities. These expectations include the requirement to accme the best 
estimate of a contingent environmental liability, even if it is uncertain. The SEC regulates 
actions of SEC registrants' managers directly; it would also influence auditors indirectly 
through its ovenight of the financial reporting process. Investoa would have been aware 
of the impact of SAB No. 92 through news reports (for exarnple, Bukro 1994; Harting 
1994; Shi and Cooper 1994). 
To surnmarize, the Canadian financial reporting standards discussed above point to 1995 
being the point in time when new standards were in place in Canada. In the US, the 
publication of SAB No.92 points to 1993 as the time when the standards changed. There 
are no pnor studies of these new Canadian financial reporting standards, but there are 
several indicators that 1993 was a pivotai point in the U.S. financial reporting regulatory 
fimework relating to environrnental liabilities. The AICPA Roundtable in January of 
1 993 highlighted the accounting and auditing profession's role (see Appendix 1). The 
issue of the SEC'S SAB No. 92 in June indicated that SEC registrants' financial reporting 
was substandard and the SEC would be enforcing a much higher level of cornpliance. 
(Further details are in Appendix 1). The results of pnor studies of US standards by Feroz, 
Park and Pastena (1991), Barth, McNichols and Wilson (1997), Stanny (1996) and Ely 
and Stanny (1997) provide empincal evidence of higher regulatory enforcement after 
1992.12 The earlier 'hud-on-the-market doctrine' of 1988 might be used as an earlier 
regulatory intervention for the U.S. setting." However, there were too few cornpanies 
reporting environmental liabilities at that time to support an empincal enquiry. 
If these higher financial reporting standards resulted in more effort by managers and 
auditon to estimate environmental liabilities, this might have the effect of increasing the 
precision (reducing the uncertainty) of the liability estimates reported in audited financial 
statements. This would have implications for the market valuation of reported 
environmental liabilities. Prior research (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1988, Swaminathan 
1991, Dharan and Lev 1993, Collins and Salatka 1993) indicates that a potential change 
associated with more precise accounting information would be an increase in the 
magnitude of the market price response to a dollar arnount of environmental liability 
reported in firms' audited financial statements. The next chapter outlines a mode1 that 
'' In the Barth et al (1997) study of factors influencing firm's environmental liability disclosurcs, the proxy 
for regulatory infiuencc was largest and most ~ i g ~ c a n t  for 1993 relative to proxies for the ycars 1990 to 
1992. Thc years 1990- 1992 were also signifiant, which may indicate a gradua1 rather than a sudden shiR 
l 3  The 'hud-on-the-market' doctrine f h t  arose in the 1970's and culminated with a Supremc Court 
decision in 1988; it might be used as a second intervention for the US, setting, but sufficient data back to 
that period are not available. in any case, the hud-on-the-rnarket doctrine represents a change in the U.S. 
adapts this theory to the case of environmental liability accmals and develops the 
predictions of the study. 
2.3 Chapter swtmas, 
This chapter has provided details of the financial reporting standards that relate to 
environmental liabilities for both Canadian and US companies. 
Iegal climate that would be consistent with the expectation that the 1993 SEC intervention increased 
managers' and auditors' effort. (See Dutta and Nelson 1995; Shulman 1989; Arlen and Camey 1992) 
CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW - THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
This study examines changes in financial reporting standards for environmental 
liabilities. These standards relate to managers' responsibility for reporting environmental 
liabilities in financiai statements and auditoa' responsibility to consider environmental 
matten during a financial statement audit. This chapter discusses how these changes 
might be associated with a change in the market's valuation of the environmental 
liabilities reported in companies' audited financial reports. The study is focused on 
accrued environmental liabilities, rather than other environmental information that may 
be disclosed in companies' financial reports. 
The chapter outlines pnor theoretical research relating to the reporting and auditing of 
environmental liability information in three components: the impact of haancial reporting 
standards; the precision of accounting information (including environmental liability 
estimates); and the relation between market values and accounting information. These 
three components are linked to generate the prediction that increases in standards for the 
financial reporting of environmental liabilities will be associated with a change in the 
valuation coefficient on the reported environmental iiability estimate. As standards 
increase, the valuation coefficient is expected to move &orn zero to negative one, 
indicating that investors believe the environmental liability accrual is more precise when 
standards are higher. 
Chapter 3 is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the relation between standards 
and estimation effort. Section 3.3 discusses the relation between effort and the precision 
of accounting information to support the rnaintained assumption that estimation effort and 
hence information precision will increase as a result of the identified regulatory 
intervention in the financial reporting process. Section 3.4 discusses the relationship 
between the precision of the environrnental liability information and market valuation, 
and then develops the research hypothesis. Section 3.5 is a summary of the chapter. 
3.2 Financial reporting standards and estimation effon 
As discussed in chapter 2, the regulatory intervention of interest in this study is the 
introduction of new standards that increase managers' and auditors' responsibility 
regarding environmental iiability estimates. In Canada, CICA auditing standards that 
clarified auditors' responsibility for detecting and evaluating environrnental liabilities 
were introduced in 1995. In the US, a corresponding regulatory intervention occurred in 
1993, when the SEC'S SAB No. 92 set out guidelines for companies' hancial reporting 
of environrnental liabilities. Tbis section discusses how these new standards would be 
expected to produce a regirne shift fiom a period of lower effort in estimating 
environmental liabilities to one of higher effort. 
These new standards would be expected to affect the actions of both managers and 
auditon in reporting environmental liabilities. In order to focus on the precision of the 
information reported, this discussion is based on the assumption that there is no 
information asymmetry behveen the manager and the auditor. This view is consistent 
with the audi tordent  negotiation mode1 provided by Antle and Nalebuff (1 99 1). They 
show that information asymmetry initially makes the auditor take a conservative stance, 
rnainly to offset potential unconservative biases in the manager's report. The evolution of 
the final report involves negotiation and risk sharing between the manager and auditor. 
Antle and Nalebuff show that this negotiation process removes the information 
asymmetry and leads to the audited report being a joint statement of the manager and 
auditor. While the mode1 is simplified, it provides the insight that the manager and 
auditor will CO-operate to produce the audited financial statements. It is possible that the 
manager and auditor do not share al1 available information, but the dynamics of the 
auditor-manager interaction under information asyrnmetry are beyond the scope of this 
study . 
Regarding the impact of the new standards on auditon, the audit literature (for example, 
Scott and Zhang 1995; Pae 1995; Dye 1993) shows that an audit has value for two 
reasons. One, the audit effort increases the usefiilness of the information for investors' 
decision-making purposes. Two, if the information is wrong the investors can sue the 
auditor for any resulting losses. In this theory, the auditor rationally anticipates the total 
cost function, including legal liability, in determining the optimal audit effort level. Audit 
effort is also referred to as audit quality in this literature. While a higher standard implies 
an increased probability of liability for a given effort level, how the auditor's effort level 
changes in response to increased standards depends on factors such as the costs of audit 
procedures, the probability of auditor liability, the potential loss, and legal costs. 
Dye (1993) presents a one-period mode1 that considen the relationship between standards 
and quality (effort) specifically. In the Dye rnodel, the auditor's effort choice is linked to 
the auditor's wealth, which acts as a ceiling on the auditor's expected litigation costs. The 
auditor's effort level choice is decided by minimizing the sum of the direct audit costs 
and the expected negligence liability. The auditor's potential loss is the lesser of the post- 
audit wealth and the negligence liability. The Dye rnodel suggests that audit effort will 
increase when standards are increased unless auditors with marginal wealth are 
predominant in practice, in which case the average audit effort rnay decrease when 
standards are raised. '' 
To assess how prevalent this decreasing case might be in practice one would need to 
know auditors' private wealth levels, but this information is not publicly available. 
Therefore, in the one-period setting of Dye (1993), auditors mut have, on average, 
substantially more wealth at stake than their potential negligence liability in order for 
'' More spccificaliy, the Dye (1993) analysis suggests that the decreasing case arises because the cost of the 
best negligcnt audit does not vary with the standard. An auditor with marginal wealth is indifferent 
between complying with the higher standard or deviating to a strictly lowcr quality. Al1 auditors with 
wcalth ncar the marginal auditor's would also revert to negligent audits whcn the standard inmases. in 
other words, for complying auditors whose wealth is only marginaUy more than the expected litigation 
cost, a higher compliance cost may shifi the balance such that they are now better off not to comply, since 
in eithcr case they cannot lose more than their (fted) wealth. This dccrcasing effort case of Dyc (1993) 
would provide theoretical support for the nul1 hypothesis that increased standards have no effect if, on 
average audit effort to increase when standards are increased. In support of this 
assumption note that, in a mubpenod setting, non-cornpliance would be expected to 
increase the auditor's costs of insuance, reptation loss and professional sanctions; these 
increases may rnake complying the optimal choice. Also, this empincal study will include 
only public companies. It seems unlikely that the auditors of public companies would 
have 'marginal' wealth given that they are likely to have continued in existence over a 
long period, and have settled some very large law suits. Moreover, prior empincal studies 
generally support the assumption that higher standards (or risk) are associated with higher 
audit effort (for exarnple, Palmrose 1988; O'Keefe, Sirnunic and Stein 1994; 
Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996). 
Further, court decisions regarding environmental liabilities have been trending toward 
recognizing the difficulty of estimating environmental liabilities and using the managers' 
efforts to understand and control environmental problems as a positive factor in assessing 
negligence (for example, Bata Industries 1993"). For auditors, the cornmon law defence 
against negligence has generally been to show that they have met the expected 
performance standards of the average, prudent auditor, such as the audithg standards 
established by the accounting profession (Girvan et al 1995; Gunz 1995). Thus, taking the 
view that more specific standards regarding environmental liabitities correspond to a 
more certain legal standard of care, it is expected that managers and auditors will comply 
with the new standards and increase their efforts to estimate this information. 
average, auditors operate with marginal wcalth at risk. Since auditor wcalth is not incIudcd in the study, 
this codd be a limitation in interprcting a nul1 result. 
l5 In the Bata Industries (1993) case, the Suprtme Court of Canada upheld the cornpany managers' 
individual liability for the company's environmental damages on appeal of the convictions and sentences 
Managers cm be expected to respond to higher costs of regulatory scrutiny by increasing 
their efforts to obtain information with which to estimate the environmental liability. The 
empirical findings of Feroz, Park and Pastena (1991) support this expectation. The 
manager can be viewed as an information source from which the auditor can obtain any 
information he or she believes is relevant to foming an audit opinion. If the manager 
already has this information, it would be efficient for the manager to provide it to the 
auditor, rather than for the auditor to reproduce it. This avoids the cost of producing 
duplicate information and of delay in issuing the audit report (as audits typically must be 
completed by certain statutory deadlines). It also avoids the cost of a qualified audit 
report, which could resuft if relevant information were not provided, and which could 
have negative employment consequences for the manager. 
It is assumed that, on average, the above trade-offs will be made such that the higher 
standards result in higher effort by both the manager and auditor to produce and veri@ 
the information used to estimate the environmental liability. Viewing the financial 
statements as the joint product of the manager and auditor, as discussed above, they both 
would be expected to produce the information in the way that minllnizes theu joint 
information production costs? 
decided in a 1992 trial. Failurc to take reasonabte action to prevent the damages was a factor used in 
esîablishing the managers' liability. 
'' A joint minimization of audit information production costs could be expected at any level of standards, 
thus the new fuiancial reporting standards would not necessarily affect this. Sb14 these higher standards 
would increase the scope of the audit examination, so that new information must be produccd by the 
auditor, or by the manager to be verificd by the auditor. Similarly, without the regulatory costs imposed by 
the new standards, îhe manager would not incur the cost of producing information. Thus the ncw financial 
reporting standards can be expected to increase the manager's and auditor's joint effort to estimate 
environmental liabilities. 
It is possible that the manager and auditor may not act jointly. In particular, the manager 
rnay be able to conceal information about environmental problems because the auditor is 
uncertain about whether such problems exist. While the intent of  the new financial 
reporting standards is to reduce this type of uncertainty, and thus make such concealment 
less likely to succeed, this is not necessarily the case for every managedauditor pair. One 
situation that might lead to this result is if the auditor lacks the power to demand more 
information or changes to the financial report. This concem is lessened somewhat in this 
empincal study because al1 the sarnple companies are publicly listed and al1 auditon are 
Big Six firms, making it reasonable to assume that auditoa will have reasonable power to 
obtain the necessary audit evidence and require that the environmental liability estimates 
reported are consistent with this evidence. 
While the information asymmetry discussed in the previous paragraph may be a realistic 
aspect of the environrnental liability reporting problem, and one that has a richly 
developed theoretical base, this study's theoretical predictions assume that there is no 
hidden information. The predictions are based on the uncertainty aspect of reported 
environrnental liability information only, so that any relevant private information that a 
manager might have is revealed tnithfully through the audit testing process. The manager 
and auditor are viewed as joint agents who generate information regarding environrnental 
liabilities" and share it with investors as soon as it becomes known. This view allows the 
" This tequires that the manager's and auditor's objectives arc cffectively aligned regarding reporting of 
the environmental liability estunate. 
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study to be focused more directly on the role that financial reporting standards may play 
in the precision of the reported environrnental liability information. 
To conclude, the theory outlined in this section indicates that when standards for the 
financial reporting of environmenial liabilities are raised, managers and auditors can be 
expected to apply more effort to estimating these liabilities. 
3.3 Precision of reported environmental liability estimates 
This section discusses the impact of more estimation effort on the precision of reported 
environmental liability amounts. The environmental liabilities reported under the 
standards discussed in Chapter 2 must be estimated in the face of considerable 
uncertainty.'* The precision of these estimates can be affected by the arnount of effort 
applied to the estimation process. The following discussion assumes that other factors, 
besides estimation effort, which may affect the underlying uncertainty of environmental 
liability mesures (for example, environmental laws or technology) are not changing. If a 
manager obtains little information with which to assess environmental problerns, the 
estirnate of the environrnental liability will be diffisely distributed. in a Bayesian 
l8  Examples of this estimation uncertainty are as follows. The activities to which environmental regdations 
apply and tjming and extent to which they will be enforced may bc uncertain. The dean-up costs 
themselvts may also be highly unceriain if Iittle or no information about thcm has been collectcd Further, 
the data requircd for environmentai liability estimation would be differcnt than that which a Company uses 
for its more traditional accounting and management information. For example, the appropriate discount 
rate to use for the future costs is not well established (Eckcl and Nehlawi 1985) and scicntific data rnay 
need to be used Note also that only pollution that can be identifkd as coming fiom a specific fïrm is 
considered hcre; pollution whose source cannot be specificaily identifïed would introcluce even p a t e r  
uncertainties. 
framework, this amounts to the manager having diffise pnors conceming the probability 
distribution of the environmental liability amount. The existence of an auditor with no 
responsibility to verify environmental liability information would have little impact on 
the estimate's precision. In contrast, as discussed above in section 3.2, if the manager and 
auditor are required to do more work because of an increase in financial reporting 
standards, this may have an impact on the estimation process. The work could involve 
reviewing more information about the details of environmental laws and regulations, the 
costly remediation actions these mandate, and the penalties, fines and prosecutions these 
provide for. 
Using a Bayesian analysis, when new information about an unknown amount is obtained, 
a decision maker can form more precise postenor beliefs about the probability 
distribution of the unknown amount. In this study, as a result of higher estimation effort, 
the estimate of the environmental liability is expected to become more pre~ise.'~ 
Combining the analysis of this section and the previous section 3.2, the expected impact 
of the increase in standards is an increase in the effort to estimate environmental 
liabilities resulting in more precise estimates. Aiso, the information must be reported 
tnithfûlly or the expected negligence liability would not be reduced. In conclusion, more 
effort to esthnate environmental liabilities is expected to produce more precise estimates 
of these arnounts. 
- - - - 
le In a static Bayesian analysis this can be viewed as obtaining a sample âom the hue population and using 
the sample information to revise one's beiiefs about the population. It is a wcii-estabihhed rcsult in 
Bayesian statistics for normalIy distributed distriiutions that, when a sampIe is taken fiorn the true 
3.4 Markel valua~ion of reported environmental liability accmals and hypothesis 
development 
This section discusses the impact of more precise estimates on the market's valuation of 
accrued environmental liabilities. The section also develops the research hypothesis. 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) use an intertemporal, multi-asset model to show that 
the magnitude of a share-pnce response relates to the precision of the (noisy) information 
signal, and to the prior investor uncertainty regarding the underlying value of the firm.20 
This model indicates that, the higher the precision of the cornpany's information report, 
the higher will be the weighting placed on the information in the market's revision of its 
beliefs about the final liquidating dividend of the firm and hence the current market value 
of its shares. 
The insight provided by Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) has been the ba i s  for the 
predictions in studies of the impact of the precision of eamings on the eamings response 
coefficient, for example, Collins and Salatka (1993); Teoh and Wong (1993); and 
Bandyopadhyay (1995). These studies used a simplified, single-penod, single-signal 
version of the Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) model to characterize the share pnce 
response to varying levels of both the noise in the Uifoxmation signal (eamings report) 
and the pnor investor uncertainty regarding the underiying value of the fim. This prior 
population, the bclicfs will be revised such that the posterior distribution has a smaller variance than the 
prior distriiutioa (for example, Winkler and Hayes 1975). 
'O More specfically, in Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) the pottntial usefuiness of the report, referred to 
as its precision, is detennined by the variance of its error term. The variances of the price changes of the 
research implies that, if a one dollar profit is reported precisely there will be a larger 
increase in price than if the profit report were imprecise. In other words, one can view 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) as a theory that predicts how the precision of reported 
accounting information relates to changes in the market value of equity (share price 
change). 
in conhast to the eamings response coefficient studies noted above, this study considers a 
liability accrual rather than an earnings repori and looks at how the level of the 
environmental liability (a component of the book value of equity) relates to the level of 
share price, rather than the change. In this study, the insight of the Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988) mode1 can be interpreted as relating the precision of the reported 
environmental liability estimate to its market valuation. This interpretation is discussed 
next. 
The theory outlined above indicates that high (low) hancial reporting standards c m  be 
expected to produce precise (imprecise) environmental liability estirnates. In this context, 
the insight of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) would irnply that a more precise 
environmental liability amount should attract a valuation coefficient that is closer to what 
would be expected for a precisely measured liability (such as a bond payable with a fixed 
tenn to maturity and a fixed interest rate, for example). The valuation framework of 
Feltham and Ohlson (1995) indicates that the theoretical valuation coefficient for a 
precisely measured liability will be negative one. In contrast, if the reported liability was 
risky assets are increasing when the precision of the report increases under various assumptions regarding 
cross-sectional (between assets) and intertemporal (between signais) comlations. 
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very imprecise the market valuation would be expected to be closer to zero since the 
estimate would be indistinguishable from noise. As Skinner (1996) points out, the 
Feltham-Ohlson (1 995) valuation framework requires a strong assumption of market 
efficiency. Also, both the Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) mode1 and the Feltham- 
Ohlson ( 1995) valuation framework maintain an assumption of complete information. 
Besides the precision of the report, a second aspect of the Holthausen and Verrecchia 
(1988) heory is the role of investon' prior beliefs about the true distribution. The theory 
predicts that if these priors are precise the report matters less than if they are imprecise. 
However, the discussion in the following paragraphs establishes that a more precise 
environmental liability report would be valued closer to negative one than would an 
imprecise report, regardless of the precision of the investors' prior beiiefs. Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988) do not consider the possibility that the information is biased, or that 
investors have prion that information is biased. So, the following discussion is based on 
the fundamental insights of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) concerning the precision 
of reported information and the feahues of the situation being shidied here.2' 
There are four possible cases to consider. First, suppose the investors' pnors are imprecise 
in both the high standards and the low standards regimes, since environmental liabilities 
'' Conventional wisdom might suggest that managers could provide biased (for cxarnple, understated) 
environmental liabiiity estirnates. Consistent with Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) and other theoretical 
work avaiiable whcn the prcsent study was conducted, the prcdiction developed in this section relies on the 
assumption that bias has no effect. Recent work by Fisher and Verrccchia (1998) explains that this no-bias- 
effect assumption rtsts on the assumptions of rationai expectations of report users and users' perfect 
knowledge of the preparefs objective fiinction. Fisher and Verrecchia (1998) show that it may be rational 
for managers to provide biased information if users have some unccrtainty about the prcparer's objective ' 
fiinction. This thesis reports the development and execution of this study in chronological order, so this 
are subject to a great deal of uncertainty. In this case, a precise report would result in the 
liability being valued at negative one. If the report is imprecise, the liability could not be 
assessed from the report or the priors, and it would be valued at zero. 
Second, suppose the prion are precise in the high regirne and diffise in the low regime. 
The environmental liability report will matter less in the high regime, but as long as the 
report is precise, the investon with precise priors will still value the liability at close to its 
theoretical value of negative one. in this case, though, they would be doing this on the 
basis of their priors rather than the report. If the report is very imprecise, the investors' 
valuation will be based on the prion and not strongly related to the imprecise report. 
Thus, even if investors' prion are more precise in the high regime than in the low, a 
valuation coefficient closer to negative one in the high regime would still be consistent 
with the report being more precise. 
Third, if investon' priors are precise in both the high and low regimes, a similar 
conclusion results as for the previous cases. If the information is more precise in the hi& 
regime, the liability's valuation coefficient will be closer to negative one than it would 
have been in the low regime when the information was imprecise. Fourth, if investors' 
priors are less precise in the high regime than the low, the coefficient would still be closer 
to negative one if the information is more precise. In this case investors would rely on the 
report, not their prion. Thus, regardless of the precision of the investors' prion in the 
high and low regimes, if the liability information reportai is more precise, the valuation 
new theoreticai work is discusscd more hlly latcr in the thesis, when it is usefiil in interpreting the study's 
rcsults, ex p s t .  
coefficient can be expected to be closer to negative one. By similar arguments, if the 
report is imprecise, the valuation coefficient can be expected to be closer to zero. 
These Four cases illustrate the point that, with valuation models in the levels, the 
researcher cm infer that the reported environmental liability is correlated with 
information already being used by investors, but inferences about whether the report 
provides new information given priors are not possible. Thus, the methodology permits 
only association tests of the information content of the reported environmental liability. 
The above discussion leads to the following prediction. If higher financial reporting 
standards for environmental liabilities result in more precise environmental liability 
estimates, the valuation coefficient on a dollar of reported environmental liability is 
expected to be closer to zero when standards are low, and closer to negative one when 
standards are high. Thus, in the empincal study we would expect the contrast between the 
pre-period and the post-penod valuation coefficients to be negative. This prediction leads 
to the following direciional research hypothesis, in altemate form: 
H,: As one moves fiom a regime of low hancial reporting standards for 
environmental liabilities to one of high financial reporting standards, the 
contrast in the valuation coefficient on a dollar of reported environmental 
liability will be negative. 
The nul1 hypothesis is, therefore: 
Ho As one moves from a regime of low financial reporting standards for 
environmenial liabilities to one of high financial reporting standards, the 
contrast in the valuation coefficient on a dollar of reported environmental 
liability wi 11 be non-negative (zero or positive). 
This chapter has drawn on theoretical research to show links arnong financial reporting 
standards, estimation effort, the precision of reported information and market valuation. 
The increase in the financial reporting standards is expected to increase the manager's 
and auditor's effort to estimate environmental liabilities. This would increase the 
precision of the environmental liability information reported in audited financial 
statements, as indicated by the market's valuation of the liability. Theory and pnor 
research have been drawn upon to generate the testable hypothesis that, as one moves 
from a regime of low hancial reporthg standards for environmental liabilities to one of 
high financial reporting standards, the change in the valuation coefficient on a dollar of 
reported environmental liability will be negative. 
CHAPTE R 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
4.1 Introduction 
The theory outlined in the previous chapter provides the prediction that a regulatory 
intervention increasing financial reporting standards for environrnental liability 
information will lead to more precise environrnental liability reports. More precise 
environmental liability information can be expected to lead to more fiequent 
environmental liability disclosures and accmals, as prior research has documented, but 
these changes could also be attribut& to legal and societal changes other than the 
regulatory intervention of interest. The main inference in this study is that, if higher 
financial reporting standards resulted in a perfectly precise environrnental liability 
estimate, its market valuation would be negative one. For example, an additional dollar of 
environrnental liability would result in the market value of the shares being one dollar 
lower. In contrast, if the estimate were totally imprecise, its valuation would be expected 
to be zero. Viewing this in terms of a regression model, if reported environmental 
liability estimates become more precise, the valuation coefficient on one dollar of 
reported environmental liability would be expected to change fiom zero, for a noisy 
estimate, toward negative one, for a precise estimate. This chapter discusses how such a 
change in market valuation is more likely to be attributable to the change in financial 
reporting standards than to 0 t h  factors. 
This chapter develops the research design. This design uses a regression of share price 
levels on environmental liability book values, and other relevant financial statement 
variables, in a quasi-experimental setting. To isolate the economic consequences of the 
regulatory intervention, the design attempts to contd  for other possible reasons that the 
market valuation would change. A key challenge in accomplishing this in a quasi- 
experimental setting is to separate the effects of the 'treatment', new standards, fiom the 
effects of other causal forces. By using a replicated, intempted time senes as the research 
design, experimental control against potential omitted explanatory variables can be 
increased (Cook and Campbell 1979). 
4.2 Experimental manipulation and poten tial outcomes 
The main question of interest in this study is the impact, if any, that new financial 
reporting standards have had on the market's valuation of reported environmental 
liabilities, which the study uses as an indicator of investors' perceptions of the 
information's precision. In this study, the higher standards are expected to result in more 
effort to estimate environmental liabilities. This higher effort is expected to d u c e  the 
measurement uncertainty and increase the precision of environmental liability estirnates. 
Several outcomes of more precise environmental liability estimates may be expected 
given the existing accounting standards for environmental liabilities. Three such 
outcomes are: more fiequent environmental iiability accnials since reasonable estimation 
can be achieved; more contingent liability and measurement uncertainty disclosure since 
more potential, if unestimable, environmental risks may be exposed; and more 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) of financial aspects of environmental 
risks. While pnor studies have docurnented that these increasing trends are occuning (for 
example, Buhr 1994; Gamble et al 1995; Stanny 1996; Li, Richardson and Thornton 
1 997), a study designed to attribute these increases to hi gher financial reporting standards 
would suffer intemal validity problems. This is mainly because these observed increases 
may also be due to changes in other variables that cannot be observed or measured 
reliably in the study (for example, changes in social expectations, changes in 
environmental laws, and changes in operations and systems). On the other hand, a change 
in the valuation coefficient is less likely to be due to factors other than a change in the 
precision of the environmental liability measure. Thus, as discussed in chapter 3, a fourth 
potential outcome is provided by the theory of Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) who 
show that an eamings announcement with more precision will be associated with a 
stronger share price response. 
Adapting the Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) theory to the case of environmentai 
liabilities, one can form the prediction that, if the environmental liability estimate were 
perfectly precise, its market valuation would be negative one (for example, one more 
dollar of environmental liability would result in the market value of the shares being one 
dollar lower). In contrast, if the estimate were totally imprecise, its valuation would be 
expected to be zero. This expectation will be tested by studying the coefficient on the 
environmental liability in regressions of share price levels on the environmental liability 
levels, and other relevant independent variables, for a cross-section of companies over 
time. " 
As noted above, increasing environmental legislation, societal expectations and other 
omitted factors are likely to result in an increase in the frequency of environmental 
liability accnials and disclosures. However, these factors are less likely to result in an 
increase in the precision per dollar of environmental liability reported; the precision of 
the reported liability point estimate is more likely to be affected by the actions of the 
manager and auditor who produce the reported information. Thus, observing a valuation 
coefficient that is closer to negative one per dollar of environmental liability accrual d e r  
the new standards are issued is more likely to be due to increased financial reporting 
standards and estimation effort. Thus, this design increases our ability to assess the 
existence of a relation between standards and information precision beyond what is 
possible by studying only trends in the accruals and disclosures. 
To summarize, the experimental manipulation is an increase in financial reporting 
standards that is expected to be associated with higher effort to estimate environmental 
liabilities. Precision of the environmental liability estimates is expected to be higher when 
financial reporting standards are higher? This manipulation is accomplished by dividing 
the sample into pre-period and post-period groups at the point when the new standards 
would become effective. As discussed above, the change fiom pre-period to post-period 
will be 1995 for the Canadian sample and 1993 for the US sample. 
" This cmpincal model is based on the earnings responst coefficient model and the Feltham and Ohlson 
(1995) valuation model. See Bernard (1995) and Johnson (1995). This model is set out in chapter 5. 
The main outcome of interest is the behaviour, at higher and lower levels of standards, of 
the valuation coefficient on the booked environmental liability in a multiple linear 
regession of share price on the environmental liability and other financial statement 
variables. Changes in the valuation coefficient can be interpreted as an indication that 
investon perceive the precision of the reported environmental liability information to 
have changed. This study's hypothesis is that the change in the valuation coefficient 
between the pre-penod and post-period will be negative. 
4.3 Validity issues and experimental design 
Evidence that would support the study's predictions can be obtained by using an 
interrupted time-senes design, in which the valuation coefficient on the environmental 
liability would be measured before and af€er the standards change. This design would 
provide information about whether the valuation coefficient covaries with standards. If it 
were observed that valuation coefficients change when standards change, this would 
strengthen our ability to infer that the two factors are related. A threat to inference 
validity in this design is that an observed change in valuation coefficient may be due to 
other histoncal events occurring at the t h e  of the intervention. Another threat is that an 
observed change is simply due to maturational changes over time in the characteristics of 
the sample companies or in the market participants. 
- 
" As discussed above, this assumes that the underlying uncertainty of the estirnates is not changing. 
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Ideally, to address such threats as those noted above, there would be a control group that 
did not receive the treatment of increased financial reporting standards and an 
experimental group of companies that did (Cook and Campbell 1979: 214). The valuation 
coefficient would be measured before and after treatment for both groups and the results 
cornpared to see if there are differences between groups. If the two groups were similar 
enough that they would be expected to be affected similarly by history or maturation 
factors, and the experimental group exhibited a change at the time of the intervention 
while the control did not, the probability that the observed change was related to the 
change in standards would be increased. 
This ideal design would not be possible in a Canadian setting alone because al1 
companies with publicly-available financial statements would have been subject to the 
sarne CICA regulatory intervention. While the US setting can't be used as a non- 
treatment control group because it experienced a similar regulatory intervention, it is still 
useful because the regulatory intervention occurred in the US at a different time (that is, 
1995 in Canada and 1993 in the US). in this study, we would therefore look for evidence 
of a change in the valuation coefficient in the US about two years earlier than in Canada 
Observing a sirnilar association between regulatory change and valuation coefficients in 
two settings at two different t h e s  can reduce the chance that the observed effect is due to 
some other history or maturation factor that would cause standards and valuation 
coefficients to covary even though they were not causally related themselves. This 
design, referred to as an intempted tirne-series with replication (Cook and Campbell 
1979: 223) would reduce the threats posed by history and maturation since it is less likely 
these would produce an observed effect at the same time as the intervention in both 
settings. In this design, when one group receives the treatment the other acts as a control 
against interna1 validity t h r e a t ~ . ~ ~  This design can also enhance external validity if a 
similar outcome c m  be observed in two different settings at two different points in time. 
This research design is shown in the diagram below. 
-- - 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Canada Oi Oi Oi Oi X, Oi Oi 
where: 
X,, is the treatment, increased standards, in each of the two countries, 
Oi is the observed relation between share pice  level and environmental liability level 
for sample companies at each year end. 
Construct validity can also be enhanced in the replicated, interrupted time series design. 
The treatrnent construct is a reguiatory intervention in financial reporthg standards that is 
expected to result in more precise estimates of environmental liabilities. Other ornitted 
factors may affect how quiclcly new standards take effect, but such factors would likely 
be different in the two settings, so the chance that observed effects are related to such 
Two such intemal validity thrcats reduced are history (events other than the treatment causing the 
observed effect) and maturation (subjects change duc to inteml maturation factors, not the treatmcnt). 
Selection is stiU a threat, because subjects are not randomly assigned to groups. In particular, seloction- 
history or selection-maturation interactions may be contriiuting to the observed effect. For exampk, the 
other factors can be reduced if similar effects are observed in both settings coincident 
with the times of the interventions in the two settings (Cook and Campbell 1979: 223). 
The sample selection method was designed to find as many companies as possible that 
reported environmental liabilities in the sîudy years. This resulted in a pooled cross- 
sectional time-series sample in which the sample firms are heterogeneous fiom year to 
year. In this case there is a threat that any noted effect may be due the heterogeneous 
sample picking up the influence of omitted correlated variables on the price-to-book 
relationship, as noted by Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995). As discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5, M e r  experimental control is brought into the research design by 
identiwing a sub-sarnple of cornpanies that appear in every year of the time senes (that is, 
a panel data sample). This panel sample allows each firm to act as its own control, thus 
reducing the threat posed by comparing heterogeneous sarnples. 
In addition to the replicated time-series experimental design, M e r  evidence that the 
financial reporting standards have an effect can be obtained by dividing the Canadian 
sample companies into hKo groups, one group that is only listed on Canadian stock 
markets and another group that is cross-listed on Canadian and US stock markets. The 
cross-listed group could be expected to change at the time of the US intervention while 
the Canada-only group would change at the tirne of the Canadian intervention, and 
potential between-country omitted variables would not be a factor. This cornparison is 
studied as a furiher robustness check on the results of the replicated tirne series study. 
Canadian companies may differ fiom the US and thercfore be exposed to different history or maturation 
factors. These selectioa interactions cannot be addrcssed in this study, givcn the data available. 
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This robustness check also addresses a limitation that &ses because the Canadian sarnple 
contains a mixture of fims that may be affected by the new standards at two different 
times, one group when the Canadian standards were issued and the other when the US 
standards were issued. If the cross-lister subsample changed at an earlier t h e  it may be 
difficult to find a significant change in this mixed Canadian sample at the later time when 
the Canadian standards were introduced. This is because any notable change in the non- 
cross-listed subsample at the time when Canadian standards change may be diluted by the 
cross-listed subsample, which exhibited a change earlier. 
The use of two settings can enhance the validity of the study, but it can also strain the 
ceteris paribus assumption underlying the research design. The threat that the regdatory 
changes are different in the two countries may be a limitation of the study. It is also 
possible that there are differences in investors between the two countries; it rnay be that 
one market is less efficient than the other. Since market efficiency is an important 
assumption underlying the valuation predictions, this is also a limitation of the study. 25 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has descnbed the shidy's research design. The experimental manipulation, a 
change in financial reporting standards for environmental 
an intempted tirne-series design. Since this manipulation 
liabilities, is studied by using 
occwed at different times in 
" Note that the potential for market efticiency to differ across observations within cach country's sample is 
reduced somcwhat by oniy selccting sample companies fiom the same (and the iargest) stock market for 
each country, that is, the TSE in Canada and the NYSE in the US. The relative cfficicncy of these two 
stock markets has not becn studied here, however. 
Canada and the US, the time senes is replicated in these two settings to increase 
experirnental control over possible omitted factors. The impact of the manipulation is 
measured by examining the behaviour of the vaiuation coefficient on reported 
environmental liabilities in a multiple linear regression of share price levels on 
environmental liability accruals and other relevant financial statement variables. 
Experirnental validity issues and possible limitations of the research design were 
discussed. 
CHAPTER 5 
SAMPLE DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
5.1 Introduction and overview 
This chapter outlines the sampling method, the data collected and the econometric model 
used to study whether there is a change in the market valuation of accrued environmental 
liabilities associated with new financial reporting standards for environmental liabilities. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2.1 describes the sarnple selection process 
and data sources. In total, 1467 company-year observations have been collected, 
representing 767 Canadian and 700 US public companies' annual reports. Canadian and 
US samples were used to provide experimental control, because the changes in financial 
reporting standards occuned at different points in time in these two couniries. This total 
sample contains a sub-sample of 468 observations that have cornpletc panel properties, 
comprising 78 companies (37 Canadian and 41 US) for the six-year penod 1991 to 1996. 
This sub-sample, refend to as the 'panel sarnple' throughout, is described in section 
5.2.2. The assessrnent of the extent to which the panel sample is representative of the full 
sarnple is described in section 5.2.3. 
Section 5.3 describes the main economehic model of the study and the process of 
selecting the model and estimation method. The econometric model uses the coefficient 
on the environmental liability variable in a multiple regression of market value on book 
value and abnormal earnings (the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) valuation model) to m e s s  
the market's valuation. Next, the results of investigating data problems and econometnc 
specification issues such as heteroskedasticity and senal correlation are described and 
descriptive statistics of the sample data are presented. The model selection process 
suggested that a pooled generalized least squares (GLS) estimation method on the panel 
sample provides a better specification than ordinary least squares (OLS). This conclusion 
is based on the observation that pooled GLS estimation resulted in more efficient and 
plausible coefficient estimates than OLS estimation for the study's cross-sectional time- 
senes data. Based on these investigations, the rest of the analysis has been done using 
pooled GLS on the panel sample data. 
5.2.1 Selection criteria and data collection 
The sample selection involved seeking out as many company annual reports as possible 
that contain environmental liability accruals. The selection of sample companies included 
the following criteria for the Canadian (US) sample: 
it is a public company with shares listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (New York 
Stock Exchange). 
its annual financial filings with the Ontario Security Commission (Securities and 
Exchange Commission) are available for 1996 or earlier years, including balance 
sheet, income statement, and financial statement notes on environmental liabilities. 
it has an accrued environmental liability amount reported in at l e s t  one year's 
financial statements. 
its primas, standard industxy classification code (SIC) is in the range 1000 to 3999; 
this range includes resource, manufacturing and processing industries. 
other information required is available for each year in which it reports an accrued 
environmental liability in its financial statements (for example, SIC and share prices) 
These critena were intended rnainly to ensure that al1 the required information for the 
study would be readily available. The SIC criterion was used to limit the search to 
companies in industries that are more likely to have environmental liabilities to report. 
For the Canadian sample, data were obtained from Ontario Security Commission (OSC) 
filings, primarily from the microfiche published by Micromedia Inc. and also nom 
Disclosure Select and Lexis-Nexis (Cancorp library). The Lexis-Nexis data base includes 
annual reports for only a few Canadian companies, mostly those that are listed on US 
markets, but it is a comprehensive source for annual reports of US public companies. So, 
for the US sarnple, al1 the annual reports were obtained fkom Lexis-Nexis (SEC On-Line 
or NAARS libraries). In both the Canadian and the US data collection, the muai report 
was reviewed and extracts were obtained, including the hancial statements and the 
portions of notes, MD&A or other discussion relating to environmental matters. Share 
prices were obtained h m  CRSP, NYSE reports and TSE reports. 
For the Canadian sample, the search strategy started fiorn a list of cornpanîes reporting 
environmentai liability accnials in 1993 that were identified in the CICA's EnvitonmentaI 
Reporting in Canada: A Suney of 1993 Reports (CICA, 1994). For each company on this 
list, the annual reports for every available year kom 1996 back were reviewed to identiw 
years in which an environmental liabiiity was reporteci. 
For the US sample it was possible to do a key-word search in Lexis-Nexis, using a search 
string that selected annual reports with 'environment' near to 'liability' (or similar words). 
The current annual reports library was searched, and the list of companies obtained formed 
the starting point for searching the years pnor to 1996. An additional key-word search of the 
1991 NAARS library was done, with a fonvard search of other years, to rnaximize the 
sarnple of companies with panel properties over the period 199 1 to 19%. The searches were 
based on 1996 and 1991 for efficiency in obtaining the largest possible sample with panel 
properties over the perîod 1991 to 1996. Additional searches based on other years were not 
done because this could only increase the sample of incomplete panel data 
Table 1 below shows the nurnber of annual reports obtained by the search exercise. In total 
1467 company-year observations were collected, made up of the annual reports of 767 
Canadian and 700 US companies. The breakdown of annual reports for each fiscal year 
h m  1996 to 1990, and for 1989 and eariier years is presented. These annual reports corne 
h m  364 di fferent companies in total (1 77 Canadian and 1 87 US companies). On average, 
there are approxirnately 4.33 years of annual reports per Canadian company and 3.74 per 
US company. 
Table 1 
Annual Reports Obtained 
Containiog Accrued Environmental Liabilities 
Canadian Total 
Total annual reports 
(company-year observations) 
1996 annual reports 
1995 annual reports 
1994 annual reports 
1993 annual reports 
1992 annual reports 
1991 annual reports 
1990 annual reports 
1989 and earlier 
Total companies 177 187 364 
Average number of  4.33 3.74 4.03 
annual reports per Company 
A limitation of the Canadian data search is that it is based on the companies for which the 
CICA obtained 1993 annual reports. To investigate this issue, the author discussed the 
CICA data collection methodology with the CICA's Director of Research. He related 
that, while their sample was not randomly collected, neither was it systematically biased 
toward companies with any particular characteristics. The annual reports were mostly 
sent to the CICA as a part of each company's routine annual report mailing. Companies 
would not have known their annual reports were to be used for a study of environmental 
reporting, or any other particular purpose. Thus, selection bias does not appear to be 
likely. To mitigate this limitation further, the search was augmented by a search for any 
Canadian annual reports available in Lexis-Nexis. The sample is also limited by data that 
are missing fiom the microfiche collections. This rnay be random, but it is also possible 
that the documents of smaller companies are more likely to be missing. For example, 
smaller fims may lack the resources to comply with every filing requirement, and the 
OCS may be less likely to overlook missing filings of larger fims than smaller firms. 
Further, the sample includes only TSE-listed companies. 
The limitations of the US search are as follows. The search will only h d  annual reports 
where the company's narrative fits the key-word search parameters. For example, if a 
company's annual report used many non-searched words in-between mentionhg 
'environment' and 'liability ', or used very obscure wording to describe its environmental 
liability, it might not be detected. Using a very general search string and reading through 
al1 the text surrounding the selected search words should have mitigated this deficiency. 
The sample also will not include annual reports that are missing h m  the Lexis-Nexis 
database for whatever reason, and by design will only include NYSE-listed companies 
with SICs of 1000-3999. Because the search was based on the 199 1 and 1996 databases, 
it would not find firms that reported environmental liabilities in other years but not in 
these two years. Such firms would not have altered the results of this study, however, 
since the main analyses use a panel sub-sample that includes only firms with observations 
in al1 six years from 1991 to 1996. 
5.2.2 The Panel saniple 
From the total 1467 observations, a sub-sarnple of companies with panel data properties 
for the penod 1991 to 1996 was identified (that is, observations are available for every 
Company in every one of the six years). This six-year penod was chosen because it would 
provide at least two yean before and two years afier the point in tirne when the identified 
regulatory changes occurred for both the Canadian and the US settings. Of the 1467 
observations, 468 were contained in complete panel data for 199 1 to 1996 and 999 were 
not. The 468 panel sample observations represent 6 years for 78 companies, made up of 
37 Canadian companies and 41 US companies. incomplete panels occur because the 
Company did not report an environmental liability in each of the six years, or it was h t  
formed after 1991, or it was taken over before 1996, or the annual report document was 
missing fiom the databases searched. 
Panel data are desirable because each Company can be used as its own control from 
period to period. This cm reduce the threat of selection bias and increase intemal validity, 
as discussed in chapter 4. As further discussed below in section 5.3, panel data can be 
analyzed using pooled generalized ieast squares (GLS) estimation to mate use of the 
information contained in the within-company observations. This cm provide a more 
efficient estimation than OLS on pooled cross-sectional tirne-senes data. 
While sornewhat srnall, the panel sample is a reasonable size for nuuiing a pooled GLS 
analysis, which is desirable given the greater efficiency of this technique compared to 
OLS. The panel sample was initially intended to be used to diagnose whether OLS would 
provide similar results to pooled GLS, thus implying that an analysis of the full sample of 
incomplete panels using OLS would be appropriate. B a d  on the results of this initial 
analysis, however, it appeared to be advantageous to use the pooled GLS technique on the 
panel sample rather than OLS on the full sample. 
The rasons for choosing to use pooled GLS were as follows: OLS exhibited 
considerably more serial correlation in the residuals than pooled GLS; OLS did not 
provide reasonable estimates for some of the coeficients in the rnodel; and OLS 
generally provided less significant estimates than pooled GLS. While there are these 
advantages to using pooled GLS estimation, a disadvantage is that the data m u t  be in 
complete panels. OnIy a subset of the data obtained have this property. Basing the 
analysis on this panel-sample subset is appropriate only if it is reasonably representative 
of  the full sample; this assessrnent is descnbed next in section 5.2.3. Based on the results 
of  these investigations, the panel sample has been used for al1 the analyses that follow. 
5.2.3 Representa~iveness of the panel sample 
To assess how representative the panel sarnple is of the total population of firms obtained 
in the data collection exercise, the full sample was used to fom a profile against which to 
compare the panel sub-sarnple. This cornparison is based on indusüy membenhip and 
three financial profile variables: total assets, book value of shareholders' equity and return 
on equity. These variables are used to capture size and industry effects that prior research 
has shown to be important for addressing selection validity threats (for example, Collins 
and Salatka 1993). For the Canadian sarnple, the nurnber of firms that are cross-listed on 
US stock markets was also studied. 
Table 2 shows the breakdown of the samples by industry groups, comparing the panel 
sample to the profile sarnple for the US and Canadian data. Table 3 compares the 
distributions of the panel and profile samples for the three financial profile variables. To 
be comparable to the data and analyses that follow, the samples in tables 2 and 3 are 
shown after deleting infiuential and unusual observations that have been identified in 
section 5.3.2 be10w.'~ One Company (six observations) has been deleted h m  the 
Canadian panel sample, and three companies (18 observations) from the US panel 
26 Wnusuai' observatious are those for which the book value of shareholders' tquity is negag,&, as further 
discussed in section 5.3.2. 
sample, leaving a panel sample of 36 companies (216 observations) for Canada and 38 
companies (228 observations) for the US. Correspondingly, the same Company (6 
observations) has been removed from the Canadian profile sample, and the same three 
cornpanies (with their 24 observations) have been removed from the US profile sample, 
leaving a profile sample of 176 companies (761 observations) for Canada and 184 
companies (676 observations) for the US." A listing of al1 the sample companies is in 
Appendix 2. 
For the industry membenhip comparisons, the differences between the profile and panel 
samples are minor for the Canadian data. For the US, the panel sample has somewhai 
more petroleum rehers  and somewhat fewer manufacachiren compared to the profile 
sample but overall the industry membership proportions are similar. For the financial 
variables cornparison, both countries' panel samples include larger companies than the 
respective profile samples; this being more so for the Canadian data. For the Canadian 
data, the panel sample contains 11 out of 36 (32%) cross-listed companies, while the 
profile sample contains 49 out of 176 (28%). These proportions are reasonably similar. 
Overall, the panel sample for each of the countries appears to be reasonably 
representative of its profile sarnple, except that the panel samples contain somewhat 
larger companies. 
27 The Canadian (üS) profiie sample contains a fkher 12 (23) unusual observations for companics that are 
not ia the panel sample. These have not been omitted fiom the data presentcd in tables 2 and 3; doing so 
makes very littie diffaence to the rcsults presented in tables 2 and 3 and would not change the conclusion 
of t&c rcprescatativcness analysis. 
Table 2 
Panel Sample versus Profile Sample Companies 
Industry Membership Comparisoo 
Canadian and US Samples' 
Part A: Canadian sam~le 
PANEL PROFILE 
Industry #rompinies kompanies 
(VO of total) (% of total) 
Oif and gas 20 (56%) 11 1 (63%) 
Food,textile,wood, paper, pnnting 5 (14%) 12 ( 7%) 
Petroleum refining 2 ( 5%) 2 ( 1%) 
Plastics O l ( l % )  
Metal refining O 2 (1%)  
Equipment manu fachuing O 5 (3%) 
TOTALS 36(100%) 1 76(100%) 
Note a 
Certain influential and unusual observations have k e n  omitted kom the data shown here to be consistent 
with the analyses that follow (see chaptcr 5, section 5.3.2). 
Table 2 (cont.) 
Panel Sample versus Profile Sample Companies 
Industry Membership Comparisoo 
Canadian and US Samples' 
Part B: US sam~le  
PANEL PROFnE 
Industry kompanies kompanies 
(% of total) (% of total) 
Oil and gas O 10( 5%) 
Food, textile,wood, paper, printing O 10( 5%) 
Chernicals 8 (21%) 31 (17%) 
Plastics 4 (1 1%) 14( 8%) 
Metal refining 7 (18%) 2 1 (12%) 
Metal fabrication 2 ( 6%) 17( 9%) 
Equipment manufacturing 5 (1 3%) 46 (25%) 
TOTALS 38(100%) 184(100%) 
Note a 
Certain iafluential and unusual observations have bcen omitttd fiom the daîa shown herc to be consistent 
with the analyses that follow (see chapter 5, section 5.3.2). 
Table 3 
Panel Sample versus Profile Sample Companies 
Financial Variables Cornparison: 
Descriptive Statistics for Total Assets, Book Value of Sbarebolders' Equity, and 
Return on Equity 
Canadian and US Sarnples' 
Part A: Canadian sam~le  
PANEL PROFILE 
n=216 n=761 
Total assets [$millions] 
Mean 1,515 883 
Minimum 4 2 
Quartile 1 65 44 
Median 302 140 
Quartile 3 1,68 1 627 
Maximum 13,532 16,038 
Book value of sharebolders' equity 
[$millions] 
Mean 746 433 
Minimum 2 -33 
Quartile 1 33 26 
Median 154 84 
Quartile 3 930 3 14 
Maximum 6,790 7,45 1 
Return on equiw 
Mean 0% 14% 
Minimum -280% -599% 
Quartile 1 1% -2% 
Median 6% 5% 
Quartile 3 10% 10% 
Maximum 254% 8871% 
Note a 
Certain influential and unusual observations have been omitted tkom the data shown herc to be consistent 
with the analyses that follow (see chapter 5 ,  section 5.3.2). 
Table 3 (cont.) 
Panel Sample versus Profile Sample Compaoies 
Financial Variables Cornparison: 
Descriptive Statistics for Total Assets, Book Value of Sharebolders' Equity, and 
Return on Equity 
Canadian and US Samples' 
Part B: US samale 
PANEL PROFILE 
n=228 n=676 
Total assets [$millions] 




Quartile 3 7,475 5,456 
Maximum 46,808 81,132 
Book value of shareholders' equity 
Minimum 17 -4,129 
Quartile 1 269 164 
Median 684 556 
Quartile 3 2,475 1,652 
Maximum 19,072 23,413 
Return on equity 
Mean 3% 11% 
Minimum -586% -872% 
Quartile 1 4% 3% 
Median 10% 10% 
Quartile 3 15% 17% 
Maximum 105% 3229% 
Note a 
Certain inBucntia1 and unusual observations have been omittcd from the data shown herc to be consistent 
with the analyses that follow (see chapter 5, section 5.3.2). 
5.3 Seleciion of econometric mode1 and estimation method - overview 
The discussion of the econometric model selection process is presented in this section. 
The model selection process involved assessing several specification issues 
simultaneously. These issues included multicollinear data, influential and unusual 
observations in the data, misspecification due to scale-related heteroskedasticity, and 
autoregression arising from using cross-sectional tirne-series data. The conclusion afler 
exarnining these issues was to use pooled GLS on the panel sample, &er removing 
influential and unusual observations, and to deflate the Canadian data by a scale factor to 
mitigate heteroskedastici ty. 
This section is organized as follows. Section 5.3.1 descnbes the main econometric model 
of the thesis. In section 5.3.2, data problems due to muiticollinearity and infIuentia1 or 
unusual observations are addressed and descriptive statistics for the panel sample, after 
removing influential and unusual observations are provided. In section 5.3.3 the 
econometric specification of the model relating to scale effects, cross-sectional 
dependencies and autoregression is exarnined. The robustness of the estimation using 
OLS as compared to pooled GLS is studied, paying particular attention to the estimation 
of the other coefficients in the model besides the environmental liability coefficient. 
Potential effects of heteroskedasticity due to scale differences are also studied. Section 
5.3.4 srnarizes the model selection exercise. 
To develop the econometnc model, the study uses the basic valuation karnework 
presented in Ohlson (1995) and Feltham and Ohlson (1995). In this k e w o r k ,  firm 
value is expressed as a fûnction of book value plus discounted future abnormal eamings, 
without reference to expected dividends. The only assumption required in this valuation 
model is the clean surplus relation in which al1 changes in book value are reported either 
as income or dividends. The basic Ohlson (1995) valuation model is: 
The econornetric model uses the firm's balance sheet and abnormal eamings to represent 
the information released to market participants. To isolate the valuation on the 
environmental liability for the purpose of this study, the accrued environmental liability is 
disaggregated fiom the book value to give model [l], the main rnodel of the thesis: 
where, for Company i, 
MV, = Market value of equity three months after year end t 
BVX,., = Book value of equity excluding the accrued environmental 
liability at year-end t 
= BVit + EL, 
EL, = Accrued environmental liability at year-end t 
AE, = Abnormal earnings for the year t 
= Net Incorneil - (1 3% * ~ook~a lue , , , , )~"  
eit = Residuals, assumed to be independently, identically distributed (i.i.d.)29 
To cornpute AE, Bernard (1995) used 13% in his empincal study of the Feltham and 
Ohlson (1995) model. Other researchers have found the specification to be insensitive to 
rates ranging from 9% to 13%, or to whether one yeafs AE or several are used to proxy 
for the Stream of future AE (for example, Dechow, Hutton and Sloan 1997; Tse and 
Yaansah 1397). Since AE is not the focus of this study, the above measure is used as a 
reasonable approximation of the company's expected future abnormal eamings." 
5.3.2 Data problems: Multicollinearity, injluential and unwual observations 
The panel data were examined for highly influential observations using the DFFITS 
statistic descnbed in Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980). This analysis indicated that most 
of the Exxon observations were highly influential. This may be because Exxon's MV and 
To specifL how expectations about hture abnormal earnings are formed, Bernard (1995) and Johnson 
(1995) suggest a modcl in which abnormal eamings foliow a simple autoregrcssivc process, such that: 
AE, = Abnormal tarnings = Net incorne, - r,,+Book value of equityi ,., 
ri, = R, -t B(&-R3 where equity beta (P) is derived h m  a daily 
market mode1 regression of fmn returns (w 
on market r e m  (R,,,). 
Prior research bas indicated that simpler definitions of AE can be used, and will lead to similar results to 
the AE mcasure shown above (for example, Tse and Yaansah 1997). This study uses a simpler definition, 
consistent with this prior research. 
l9 It should be noted that, in addition to i.i.d. error ttrms, the model assumes that the parameters arc 
constant across both cross-sectional and tirne-scries units. These arc strong, restrictive assurnptions that arc 
likely to bc violated by the data, and thus various tests have becn used to asscss these mode1 specification 
C o n c ~ .  
BVX balances were twice as large as the next largest observations. To retain the panel 
properties, al1 six Exxon observations were removed From the panel sample, representing 
approximaiely 2% of the US observations. This approach is similar to that used by 
Dechow, Hutton and Sloan (1997). 
The panel data also included three companies (one Canadian and two US) that had 
negative book values of equity in one or more penods. The mode1 [1] levels specification 
may not be well defined when BV is negative since MV will never be negative. 
Consistent with other studies of level specifications (for example, Barth 1994, Dechow, 
Hutton and Sloan 1997) the observations for the three firms with negative book values 
were omitted." 
In total, one Canadian and three US Company panels were removed, leaving a panel 
sample of 216 Canadian observations (36 companies tirnes six years) and 228 US 
observations (38 companies times six years). Tables 4 and 5 provide descriptive statistics 
of the main variables for the panel sample after infiuential and negative book value 
observations have been removed. The tables include information for both raw variables 
and variables after deflation by a scale factor (total assets) since both are considered in 
the analysis that follows. 
JO Sensitivity analyses for this study using rates ranging fiom 7% ta 16%, and using net income instead of 
AE, are described in chapter 6. ïhese analyses indicate the results art not sensitive to the AE mcasure. 
" Thcse prior studies also omitted observations with negative AE, but in this snidy many of the sample 
cornpanies suffered losses, especially in 1992 and 1993, so too much data wou1d be lost if thesc were 
excluded from the analysis. Removing negative AE observations h m  the panel sample would leave a total 
of 162 incomplete panel observations for the Canadian and US samplcs combined. 
Table 4 shows the distributions of the four main variables, MV, BVX, EL and AE and the 
scale factor, TA. The table shows that the means are several times larger than the medians 
for al1 four of the raw variables. This indicates that the distributions are skewed, with 
smaller values being more numerous. This is less pronounced for the scaled variables. 
Table 5 reports the correlation matrices for the raw variables in Part A, and for the 
deflated variables in Part B. For both Canadian and US samples, the correlations are 
relatively hi& (M.80) for the raw measures of BV and EL, BV and TA and TA and EL. 
The correlations behveen deflated independent variables are al1 less than 0.40. For the 
Canadian variables the correlations between AE and EL and AE and BVX are both 
negative. This is probably because AE often has a negative value. For example, the first 
quartile of the AE distribution for the raw Canadian variables is -$3,333,000. 
in view of some high correlations between raw independent variables, the potential for 
multicollinearity to be affecting the results was considered. The extent to which 
rnulticollinear data are harming regression estimates may be indicated by condition 
indices, with indices of 30 to 100 indicating strong dependencies in the data (Beldey, 
Kuh and Welsch 1980). Computation of condition indices for these variables resulted in 
no condition index greater than 19 for the Canadian and the US data, leading to the 
conclusion that multicollinearity problems are not severe." 
These condition indices arc for the deflated Canadian data and the raw US &ta sincc these are used in 
the subsequcnt d y s e s  of the thesis. Condition indices indicate muiticobearity rnay be a problcm for the 
raw Canadian &ta, howcver raw Canadian data are not used for the subsequcnt analyses. This is because, 
based on the mode1 specification investigation below in section 5.3.3, &ta problmns in the Cimadian 
sample appear to be lessened by using deflated data. 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics 
Distributions of the Variables: Raw and Deflated 
Canadian and US Panel Samples' 
Canadian Sample US Sample 
Variables (n=2 14) (n=22 8) 
[$millions] 
RAW DEFLATED RAW DEFLATED 
MV, Market value of equity 
Mean 1,39 1 1.29 5,674 0.84 
Minimum 2 O. 17 22 0.16 
Quartile 1 66 0.65 484 0.53 
Median 324 0.95 1,460 0.76 
Quartile 3 1,293 1.50 5688 1 .O5 
Maximum 14,870 8.75 59,834 2.66 
Standard deviation 2,48 1 1.1 1 10,504 0.46 
BVX, Book value of equity excluding environmental liability 
Mean 780 0.57 2,536 0.44 
Minimum 2 0.1 1 23 0.02 
Quartile 1 34 0.47 272 0.34 
Median 160 0.58 72 1 0.43 
Quartile 3 955 0.68 2,728 0.50 
Maximum 7,110 0.97 20,396 0.92 
Standard deviation 1,361 0.17 4,365 0.15 
EL, Environmental liability 
Mean 34 0.02 229 0.03 
Minimum <1 0.00 0.4 0.00 
QuartiIe 1 1 0.0 1 14 0.0 1 
Median 5 0.0 1 39 0.03 
Quade 3 30 0.03 197 0.04 
Maximum 490 0.18 2,934 0.20 
Standard dcviation 80 0.02 430 0.02 
Table 4 (cont) 
Descriptive S tatistics 
Distributions of the Variables: Raw and Deflated' 
Canadian and US Panel Samplesa 
Canadian Sample US Sample 
Variables (n=2 16) (n=228) 
($rnillioasI 
RAW DEFLATED RAW DEFLATED 
AE, Abnormal earnings 
Mean -5 1 -0.06 -27 -0.02 
Minimum -937 - 1 .O6 - 1,20 1 -0.53 
Quartile 1 -3 -0.01 1 0.00 
Mcdian 3 0.02 34 0.03 
Quartile 3 19 0.04 144 0.05 
Maximum 279 0.29 2,509 0.13 
Standard deviation 145 0.1581 338 0.67 







Standard devia tion 
1,515 d a  6,548 
4 d a  40 
63 nla 618 
302 d a  1,669 
1,68 1 d a  7,475 
13,532 d a  46,808 
2,66 1 d a  10,505 
Note a 
Influential and negative book value observations omitttd. 
Total assets is the deflation factor. 
Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics 
Correlation Matrices of the Variables: Raw and Deflated 
Canadian and US Panel Samples' 
Part A: Canadian sam~le (n=216) 
Raw Variables 
MV BVX EL AE TA 
M V  1 .O000 
BVX 0.8456 1 .O000 
EL 0.7069 0.8706 1 .O000 
AE -0.3256 -0.5696 -0.5863 1 .O000 
TA 0.7870 0.9773 0.8441 -0.5746 1 .O000 
MV BVX EL AE TA 
Deflated Variables 
MVITA BVX/TA EL/TA AEITA 
MV/TA 1 .O000 
BVX/TA 0.449 1 1 .O000 
EL/TA -0.1 130 0.0674 1 .O000 
AEA'A 0.1433 -0.1013 -0.1375 1 .O000 
MV/TA BVX/TA ELîTA AE/TA 
Note a Influential and negative book value observations omitted. 
Total assets is the deflation factor. 
Table 5 (cont.) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Correlation Matrices of the Variables: Raw and Deflated 
Canadian and US Panel Samples' 
Part B: US s a m ~ l e  (n=228) 
Raw variables 
MV BVX EL AE TA 
MV 1 .O000 
BVX 0.9179 1.0000 
EL 0.7702 0.86 18 1 .O000 
AE 0.2427 0.027 1 -0.0 19 1 1 .O000 
TA 0.9439 0.975 1 0.8274 0.0885 1 .O000 
M V  BVX EL AE TA 
Deflated Variables 
MVîïA BVXiTA EL/TA AE/TA 
Note a Influential and negative book value observations omitted. 
Total assets is the deflation factor. 
5.3.3 Mode! specrfication: Scale effects and estimation method 
The following analyses assess econometric estimation methods and scaling factors 
simultaneously io detemine the opthal econometric approach for the study. The 
assessrnent is intended to find the model that is least subject to misspecification problems 
and has reasonable statistical power. Optirnizing the specification is an important 
consideration in this study because the EL values are small relative to the other variables 
in the model, and the impact of the changes in standards on the valuation of EL may be 
subtle. 
Scale differences in cross-sectional market values can produce misspecification due to 
heteroskedasticity. Intuitively, as described in Barth and Kallapur (1996), the observable 
values of variables of interest may be affected by the unobservable scale factor, but a 
researcher is interested in the relation between the 'tnie' variables afier controlling for 
scale differences. The researcher's challenge is to purge the scale factor's effect fiom the 
observed variables without purging the effect of the tnie independent variable. 
Barth and Kallapur (1996) suggest that heteroskedasticity can be detected by cornparhg 
the standard OLS t-statistic to the White heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistic. If the 
White t-statistic is lower then this may indicate heteroskedasticity is present." 
Preliminary analyses for this study indicated a large drop in significance when the White 
'' The White t-statistics may have poor propertics in finite samples (cg. less than 400 observations). The 
MacKinnon-White jackknife version of the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimators may 
be more reliablc in finite samples such as those in this study. in view of this, the analysis was redonc using 
the MaciCimon-White approach, as described in White (1993). None of the conclusions would bt different 
becausc there is very little difference in the signifïcance lcveis of the estimates obtained under these two 
approaches. 
t-statistic was used for the Canadian sample. For the US sample the White t-statistic was 
also less significant but the decrease was smaller than for the Canadian data. In view of 
this result, various methods of addressing potential scale-related heteroskedasticity in the 
data were undertaken. 
Proxies for the scale factor that have been used in prior research include total assets, 
number of shares outstanding, book value of equity, net income, or sales (for example, 
Demers 1997, Johnson 1995, Sougiannis 1994, Arnir, Harris and Venuti 1993). Given the 
data and the variables used in this study, total assets and number of shares outstanding 
were potential scale facton. Preliminary anaiysis comparing these two scale facton 
indicated that number of outstanding shares produced implausible coefficient estimates, 
and consequently year-end total assets balance was used as a scale factor in subsequent 
specification analyses. 
In most of the prior studies, the scale factor is used as a deflator of the raw variable 
measures. Barth and Kallapur (1996) suggest that inclucüng the scale factor as an 
independent variable may be superior to deflation, for certain forms of heteroskedasticity. 
In consideration of this, the following three aiternate specifications of the main model [l] 
using total assets as a scale factor were exarnined: 
1) 'Raw' is model [l] as above, 
2) 'Raw plus total assets as an independent variable' is model [l] above with the scale 
factor used as a nght-hand-side variable, and 
3) 'Raw deflated by total assets' is mode1 [1] with al1 variables divided by the scale factor. 
These three models have been estimated by hvo different estimation methods. The first 
method is OLS (with White t-statistics) on the pooled cross-sectional the-senes data. 
The second method is a pooled GLS estimation program." In a cross-sectional time-series 
sample, the OLS assurnption that ail the observations are independent can lead to 
misspecification due to serial correlation of the error terms for observations fkom the 
same Company. Intuitively, autoregressive residuals result in ineficieni OLS estimators 
because the dependence arnong the residuals reduces the effective number of independent 
pieces of information in the sample. (Kmenta 197 1 : 274-275). 
The pooled GLS technique follows the method descnbed by Kmenta (as descnbed in 
White (1 993)). This estimation technique assumes cross-sectional heteroskedasticity" and 
time-wise autoregression. The Kmenta method provides a better specification than OLS, 
by using the within-company correlation coefficients as estimates of the autoregressive 
parameters, pi, for each cross-sectional unit, with the estimate of pi confined to the 
interval [-1, +Il. The estimated pi are then used to transform the observations and obtain 
more efficient estimators. 
" This smdy uses the pooled GLS routine that is pre-programmed in the Shazam statistical program (the 
'POOL' routine, as describcd in White (1993)). The pooled GLS technique requires complete panel data, so 
only the panel sample could be used The fiill sarnple does not have panel properties, so it would nced to bc 
analyzed with OLS. Advanced economcîric techniques that address seriai correlation in incomplete panel 
data have bccn descnied in theory (cg. Hsaio 1993; Greene 1997) but deveIoping a program to cxtcutc 
these is left to fiiture research. 
Cross-sectional independence is assumcd in this estimation technique. 
Comparative results for these analyses for the Canadian and US sarnples are in table 6. 
Regarding the choice between the OLS and the pooled GLS estimation methods, table 6 
shows that the pooled GLS estimates are as, or more, significant than OLS estimates for 
al1 the mode1 coefficients. This is the case for both the Canadian and the US samples. 
This is consistent with the pooled GLS estimators being more efficient. 
To assess whether there are scale-related problems in the data, the coefficient estimates 
were considered in light of the expected coefficient values indicated by the Feltharn- 
Ohlson valuation framework. This theoretical h e w o r k  indicates that a precise rneasure 
of BV would have a coefficient of one, a precise liability would have a coefficient of 
negative one, and AE would have a positive coefficient of indetexminate magnitudeM. 
For the US estimates shown in table 6 - part B, the 'Raw' specification produced 
reasonable coefficients on al1 the coefficients, so that scale differences do not appear to be 
a factor in the US sarnple. For the Canadian results, shown in table 6 - part A, deflating 
by a scale factor appears to provide the most plausible estirnates of the three models. This 
has been determined by cornparhg the pooled GLS results, as these have been show to 
be more efficient than the OLS estimates. For the 'Raw' model the coefficient estimate on 
the environmental liability is marginally significant e.1659)  but positive, opposite to 
the theoretical expectation. This estimate is Unplausible because it implies the market is 
valuing a liability as though it 
In contrast, al1 the estimates 
were an asset, and may therefore indicate misspecification. 
from the deflated model correspond more closely to the 
Pnor research has found AE coefficients ranging fkom 3 to 6, approximately (for example, Dcchow, 
Hutton and Sloan 1997; Tse and Yaansah 1997) 
theoretical expectations; this may indicate a better specification. Thus, scale-related 
heteroskedasticity rnay be a problem in the Canadian data, so the study has used the 
deflated variables to mitigate this. 
A possible reason that the Canadian sample would have scale-related heteroskedasticity 
and US sarnple would not is that the EL variable is less material in the Canadian 
companies. For example, the median of EL is about 5.3% of the median of BVX for the 
US sample, but only 2.9% in the Canadian sample. Since al1 the study's analyses are done 
on the Canadian and US samples separately and no direct cornparisons of the two samples 
are made, the Canadian data have been deflated to mitigate heteroskedasticity and the US 
data have been left raw. 
Further, a visual inspection of residual plots for the OLS and pooled GLS estimations 
revealed that the OLS residuals displayed a notable serial correlation pattern, while the 
pooled GLS residuals displayed a more random pattern for both the Canadian and the US 
samples. This is also consistent with pooled GLS being a more efficient estimation 
method than OLS. 

Table 6 (cont.) 
OLS versus Pooled GLS Estimations and Comparison of Scsling Approachesa 
Canadian and US Panel Simples 
Part B: US sam~le (n=228) 
OLS Pooled GLS 
estimate pvalue estimate p-value 
'Raw ' 
B W  2.2883 .O000 2.3599 ,0000 
EL - 1 .O329 ,6663 - 1 S668 .OS58 
AE 6.7228 ,0035 2.4 140 ,0000 
CONSTANT 289020 ,1554 89526 ,0652 
R2 0.8905 0.881 4 
'Raw plus total assets as an independent variable' 
BVX 0.4049 .3235 0.5206 .O1 14 
EL -0.3 195 A835 -0.6960 ,4607 
AE 5.2632 ,0007 2.502 1 .O000 
TA 0.7767 .O000 0.7202 .O000 
CONSTANT -220 150 .1733 - 174750 .O0 14 
R 0.9 176 0.8546 
'Rnw deflated by total assets' 
BVX 1.2001 .O000 0.8 164 .O000 
EL 0.1561 3727 0.93 19 .O497 
AE 1.2336 .O309 0.5429 .O020 
CONSTANT 0.3320 -0000 0.4227 .O000 
R2 0.2020 0.2597 
Model: 
[ I I  MV,, = bo + blBVXii + b2ELit + b3AEit + tit 
where, for Company i, 
MV,, = Market value of cquity three months a f k  ycar end t 
BVX,, = Book value of equity excluding the accrued environmental liability at year end t 
EL, = Accrued environmental iiability at year end t 
AEit = Abnormal caniings for the year t 
= Net Income, -(1 3%*BookValueit.,) 
TA,, = Total assets at year end t 
et = Residuals, assurned to be independcntly,identicafly distributed 
Note a 
p values for OLS estimates are bascd on White t-statistics. 
R2 for pooled GLS estimates are goodness-of-fit mcasures computed by the Buse method (White 1993). 
lnfluential and negative book value observations omitted 
The results of the mode1 selected for the subsequent analyses are shown above in boldface. 
5.3.4 Conclusion of model sefection 
The foregoing exercise leads to the conclusion that pooled GLS on the panel samples, 
with the Canadian data deflated by a scale factor, is the best estimation technique to use 
for this study. As discussed in section 5.2.2, the panel sarnple is reasonably representative 
of the full sample of companies that report accrued environmental liabilities, and so the 
results of analyzing this subsarnple may be generalizable to the full sample. 
in view of the above discussion and analysis, the econometnc analysis that follows uses 
pooled GLS on the panel sample, after omitting influential and negative-book-value 
observations. The Canadian data are deflated by a scale factor, total assets. 
5.4 Chapter surnrnary 
This chapter has presented the sample selection process and data sources. The analysis 
leading to the choice to use the panel sample was described. The selection of the 
econometric model and estimation by the pooled generalized least squares (GLS) method 
was discussed. Based on these investigations, the remainder of the analysis uses pooled 
GLS on the panel sample data. 
CHAPTER 6 
EMPIFUCAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Chapter 6 presents the study's empirical analyses and discusses the results. Section 6.2.1 
presents an analysis of the change in the environmental liability coefficient at the time 
when the financial reporting regulation changes are expected to have become effkctive. 
This analysis indicates that there is a significant positive change in the environmental 
liability coefficient at the identified time for the US companies (1993), while the change 
at the identified time for the Canadian companies (1995) is not significant. Further 
analyses of the general trends in the environmental liability coefficient over time are then 
described in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3. The results of these trend analyses are also 
consistent with there being a positive change in the environmental liability coefficient 
over the study period. All the analyses provide environmental liability coefficient 
estimates that are negative in every period. These results provide evidence that the 
environmental liability coefficient becomes less negative over the study period, contrary 
to the research hypothesis. 
A further robustness check of the Canadian results indicates that a significant positive 
change in the coefficient does occur at 1993, the identified tirne of the US change. 
Additional robustness checks indicate that these results are not sensitive to outlier data or 
alternate variable rneasures. The robustness checks are described in section 6.2.4. Section 
6.3 discusses the results and offers a possible interpretation. Section 6.4 sumrnarizes the 
chapter. 
6.2 lmpact of change in fiancial reporting standards - oveniew of analyses 
This study has identified changes in financial reporting standards for environmental 
liabilities that would be expected to lead to changes in the market's valuation of these 
arnounts. It is hypothesized that the valuation coefficient will change in a negative 
direction, fiom zero towards negative one, after the new standards corne into effect. To 
study the impact of the new standards, the panel data were examined for a change in the 
environmental liability valuation coefficient between the period before the new financial 
reporting standards ('pre-penod') and the period after ('post-penod'). As descnbed in 
chapter 2, the new regulations were in place fiom 1995 on in Canada, and fiom 1993 on 
in the US. Two additional analyses of the trend in the EL coefficient were performed. 
One trend analysis estimates year-by-year EL coefficients, and the other estimates the 
trending and non-trending components of the EL coefficient. To address the fact that the 
Canadian panel sample includes some companies that are also cross-listed on US stock 
markets, a further analysis of the Canadian data was undertaken using the same change 
point as the US, 1993. The approaches used in most of the analyses are an adaptation of 
the analysis of covariance approach used in Collins and Salatka (1993) in which changes 
in coelficient estimates, or 'contrasts', are examined. In these analyses the intercept and 
the coefficients of BVX and AE are assumed to be stable over the period. 
6.2.1 Pre-period to post-period contrast annlysis 
The main analysis of the thesis examines the pre-post contrast in the environmental 
liability coefficient, using the times at which the new financial reporting standards came 
into force to divide the data into pre-penod and post-period observations. For this 
analysis, the following periods are defined: 
Canada- pre-penod is 1991 - 1994 
- post-period is 1995 - 1996 
US - pre-penod is 1991 - 1992 
- post-period is 1993 - 1996 
The following approach was used to estimate the coefficient change: 
Let Di[ = 1 if observation is in the post-penod 
O if observation is in the pre-period 
To estimate the pre-penod coefficient and the pre-post contrast, the main model [l] was 
adjusted to allow the EL coefficient, b2, to Vary over the two periods, giving model [2] as 
follows: 
Table 7 shows the model [2] estimates including the pre-period EL coefficient and its pre- 
period to post-period change. Part A(B) reports the Canadian(US) results. The US data 
indicate a significant change to a less negative coefficient. The pre-period coefficient is 
-4.48 (p=.0003) and the change fiom the pre-penod to the post-penod is 2.22 @=.0073). 
For the Canadian sample, the pre-period EL coefficient is -3.33 @=.0023). The pre-post 
contrast estimate from the Canadian data at the assurned break point is 1.43, but this is 
not statistically signi ficant @=.2850). These results do not support the study's hypothesis 
that the contrast will be negative. Thus, the nul1 hypothesis that the contrast is non- 
negative (zero or positive) cannot be rejected. 
Table 7 
Pooled GLS Estimation 
EL Coefficient Estimates for Pre-period versus Post-period 
and Pre-post Contrast 
Canadian and US Panel Samples 
Part A: Canadian s a m ~ l e  h=216) 
Pre = 1991-4 
Post = 1995-6 
Variable Coefficient Standard t-ratio 
estimate deviation 211 df p-value 
BVX 
EL - pre-period 
EL - pre-post contrast 
AE 
Constant 
where, for Company i, 
MVit = Market value of equity three months after year end t 
BVX,, = Book value of cquity excluding the accrued environmental liability at year end t 
EL,, = Accrued environmental liability at year end t 
AE, = Abnormal earnings for the year t 
= Net hcomek -(13%*BookVal~e~,~~,) 
Dit = 1 if observation is in the post-period 
O if observation is in the pre-p+xiod 
el, = Residuals, assurned to be independently,identically distributed 
Note a 
R2 for pooled GLS estimates arc goodness-of-fit measures computed by the Buse method (White 1993). 
Influential and negative book value observations omitted. 
Canadian data are deflatcd by a scale factor, total assets. 
Table 7 (cont) 
Pooled GLS Estimation 
EL Coefficient Estimates for Pre-period versus Post-period 
and Pre-post Contrast ' 
Canadian and US Panel Samples 
Part B: US sam~le  @=228) 
Pre = 1991-2 
Post = 1993-6 
Variable Coefficient Standard t-value 
estimate: deviation 223 df p-value 
BVX 
EL - pre-period 
EL - pre-post contrast 
AE 
Constant 
where, for Company i, 
MV,, = Market value of equity tbree rnonths after year end t 
BVX,, = Book value of equity excluding the accnied environmcntal liabiliv at year end t 
EL,, = Accrued environmental liability at year end t 
AE, = Abnonnal earnings for the year t 
= Net Incorne, -( 1 3%*BookValuei,,. J 
Dit = 1 if observation is in the post-period 
O if observation is in the pre-period 
ei~ = Residuals, assumed to be independently,identically distributed 
Note a 
Rt for pooled GLS estimates are goodness-of-fit mesures cornputcd by the Buse methoci (White 1993). 
Influential and negative book value observations ornitted. 
US data are undeflatcd. 
To examine the significance of the post-period coefficient, the Krnenta approach, as 
descnbed in Collins and Salatka (1993: 135) was used. The following restriction on 
model [2] was tested: 
b2FQST = 4 P R E  + @ZPOST - b P R E )  = 
The restriction was tested by computing the following F statistic: 
F(,,kl = (SSE, - SSE,) / r 
9 
SSE, / (n - k) 
where SSE, is the sum of squared errors fiom the restricted regression, SSE, is the surn 
of squared errors fiom the unrestricted regression, r is the number of restrictions, n is the 
number of observations and k is the number of parameters in the unrestricted model. For 
both couniries there is one restriction and there are five unrestricted parameters. For 
Canada (US) there are 216(228) observations. The F-value for the Canadian sample is 
218.33, leading to a rejection of the nul1 restriction @-value c .01). For the US sample the 
F value is 225.96, also leading to a rejection of the restriction @value < .O 1). 
As an alternative test to the F-test above, the post-perîod coefficient itself and its 
significance were estimated by using model [3] below: 
where, 
D', = 1 if observation is in the pre-period 
O if observation is in the post-period 
and al1 the other variables are as defined above. 
Estimating rnodel [3] provides a post-penod coefficient of -1.9026 @=.2139, not 
significant) for the Canadian sarnple and -2.2576 (p=.0161) for the US sample. These 
inferences are consistent with the F-tests for the US sample, implying the US post-period 
coefficient is significantly different fiom zero. For the Canadian sample, the model [3] 
regression indicates that b,, is not significantly different fiom zero, while the F statistic 
on model [2] indicates b,,,, defined to equal [b,,, + (b, - b2p&J, is not These 
opposite inferences may arise in the Canadian sample because the model [3] estirnate of 
the post-period EL coefficient is only marginally insignificant. To sum up, it can be 
inferred fiom these tests that the post-period EL coefficient is significantly different fiom 
zero for the US sample, but for the Canadian sample the results are less conclusive. 
6.2.2 Year-by-year trend analysis 
As a M e r  analysis of the behaviour of the EL coefficient over tirne, the coefficients in 
each year of the six-year period were examined. Table 8 reports the BVX and AE 
coefficients for the full period and the year-by-year EL coefficients. The regressions to 
--  - 
'' It is worthwhile noting that in later rabusmess checks in section 6.2.4, where thc transition ytar for the 
Canadian data is re-dcfined to occur at 1993, the pst-period EL coeficicnt on the Canadian samplt is 
significantly differcnt fiom zero under eithcr the t-test or the F-test. 
produce these coefficient estirnates are an expansion of the Collins and Salatka (1993) 
approach, as follows: 
[4] MV,, = c, + c,BVX, + c,EL, + c,AE, + c4(ELfY92), + c5(EL*Y93), 
+ c,(EL*Y94),, + c,(EL*Y95), + c,(EL*Y96),, + ei, 
where, in addition to the variables defined above: 
Y9T = Z if year is 199T, T= 2,3,4,5,6 and 
O otherwise 
Mode1 [4] allows the EL coefficient to Vary fiom year to year. The relevant contrasts 
berneen the 1991 EL slope coefficient, c, , and the other years' EL coeficients are the c, 
values (j = 4,5,6,7,8), giving the following year-by-year slope coefficients: 
Year-by year EL slope coefficients 
The significance of the 199 1 slope coefficient and the BVX and AE coefficients are given 
by t-tests on the coefficients fiom estimating model [4]. To estimate and test the 
significance of the slope coefficients for 1992 to 1996, five versions of model (51 below 
were used. The version of model [SI s h o w  below provides an estimate of the 1992 EL 
coefficient, (q+c,), and allows a t-test of its significance, as follows: 
[SI MV, = a, + a,BVX,, + -ELit + a,AE, + a4(EL*Y92 - EL)i, + a5(EL*Y93), 
+ $(EL*Y94) it + a,(EL*Y95), + %(EL*Y96) it + eit 
where a, = (c, + c,). Mode1 [SI was obtained by adding and subtracting c,*EL in mode1 
[4] and rearranging. This is technique was repeated to obtain significance levels for the 
other four yearly coefficients. 
Table 8 indicates that the EL coefficient from the Canadian (US) sample generally 
becomes less negative over the six-year period, going nom -8.17 (-5.80) in 1991 to -2.92 
(-1.6 1) in 1996. For the Canadian sample the estimates for 1993 and 1996 are not 
significant, and for the US sarnple the 1993, 1995 and 1996 yearly coeficients are not 
significant. 
Table 8 
Pooled GLS Estimation 
Full Period BVX and AE Coefficients, and Year-by-Year EL Coefficients 
Canadian and US Panel Samples ' 
Part A: Canadian s a m ~ l e  (n=216l 
Variable Coefficient Standard t-value 
estimate deviation 207 df p-value 
BVX 
AE 
CONSTANT 0.0475 O. 1292 0.3674 -7 173 
R2 ,4047 
Models: 
(41 MV,, = c0 + cIBVX,, + c2ELit + c3AEit + C, (ELZY92) it + c5(ELeY93) i, 
+ c, (ELZY94) , + c, (ELZY95) + C, (EL*Y96) it + ci, 
[SI (1 992 version, variations of mode1 [ 5 ]  are used for f 993 to 1996) 
MV, = a, + a,BVX,, + a,ELi, + a,AE,, + a, (ELZY92 - EL) + a5 (ELeY93)it 
+ a, (ELZY94), + a,(EL*Y95) ii + a, (ELZY96) ii + e, 
where, for Company i, 
MVi, = Market value of equity three months afler ycar end t 
BVX,, = Book value of equity excludhg the accmed environmcntal liability at year end t 
EL, = Accmed environmental liability at year end t 
AE, = Abnonnal earnings for the year t 
= Net Incorne, -(13%* BookVal~e,,~.,) 
Y9T = 1 if year is 199T, T= 2,3,4,5,6 and 
O othcrwise 
eit = Residuals, assumed to be ùidependently, identically distn'buted 
Note a 
R2 for pooleà GLS estimates arc goodness-of-fit measurts cornputcd by the Buse method (White 1993). 
Muential and negative book value observations omitted. 
Canadian &ta are deflated by a scale factor, total assets. 
Table 8 (cont.) 
Pooled GLS Estimation 
Full Period BVX and Al3 Coefficients and Year-by-Year EL CoeCficients 
Canadian and US Panel Samples ' 
Part B: US sam~le  (n=228) 
Variable Coelficient Standard t-value 
estimate deviation 219 df p-value 
CONSTANT 6 1962 46092 1.3443 -1802 
R~ .8925 
Modeis: 
[4] MV,, = co -t C,BVX,~ + c,EL,, + c,AE,, + c, (EL*Y92) it + c5(ELSY93) it 
+ C6 (ELeY94) ,t + C, (EL'Y95) + cl (EL*Y96) il + eit 
[5] (1 992 version, variations of mode1 [ 5 ]  are used for 1993 to 1996)) 
MV,, = a,, + a,BV& + a,EL,, + a,AE,, -t a, (EL*Y92 - EL), + a5(EL*Y93),, 
+ a, (ELeY94) ,, + a,(EL*Y95) ,, + a,(EL*Y96),, + el, 
where, for Company i, 
MV, = Market value of equity ttuee months after year end t 
B w ,  = Book value of equity excluding the accmed environmental liability at year end t 
EL, = Accrucd environmental liability at year end t 
AE, = Abnonnal e&gs for the year t 
= Net Incorne, -(13% * Bo~kValue,,~. ) 
Y9T = 1 if year is 199T, T= 2,3,4,5,6 and 
O otherwise 
ei I = Residuals, assumed to be independcntly, identicaily distriiuted 
Note a 
R2 for pooled GLS estimates are goodness-of-fit measures computed by the Buse method (White 1993). 
infîuential and negativt book value observations omitted. 
US &ta are undeflated. 
6.2.3 Trend componenf analysis 
A hirther trend analysis is provided by estimating a mode1 in which the EL coefficient is 
split into a trend component and a non-trending component." The results of this trend 
component analysis are presented in Table 9. 
Mode1 [6] is used to estimate the trend and non-trending components of the EL 
coefficient and their significance levels, as follows: 
where, 
T =  lifyearis1991 
2 if year is 1992 
3 if year is 1993 
4 if year is 1994 
5 if year is 1995 
6 if year is 1996 
b2 = 4 i + @z.2* T) 
b, is the non-trending component of the EL coefficient for the six year period 
b2-2 is the trend component of the EL coefficient for the six year period 
The results in Table 9 indicate that the non-trendhg component has a negative value of 
4.57 (p=.03 1 7) for the Canadian sample and -5.84 (p=.0000) for the US sample. For the 
Canadian sample the trend component estimate is 0.41, but this estimate is not significant 
(p=.4089). For the US sample, the trend component estimate for the US coefficient is 
0.95 @=.0004). These results are consistent with the pre-post analysis in Table 8, 
indicating the EL coefficient is negative and has generally become less negative over the 
period studied. As in the pre-post analysis, the results for the Canadian sample are 
inconclusive. 
Y 1 un grateful to Rofessor Tony Wijanto for suggesting this approach. 
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Table 9 
Pooled CLS Estimation 
Trend and Non-treoding Cornponents of the EL Coefficient 
Canadian and US Panel Samples ' 









161 MV,, = bo + b, BVX,, - b2.,EL,t - bZ2(EL,, T)+ b, AE,, + el, 
where, for Company i, 
MV,, = Market value of equity three months after year end t 
BVX,, = Book value of equity excluding the accrued environmental liability at year end t 
EL,, = Accrued environmental liability at year end t 
AE,, = Abnormal eamings for the year t 
= Net Incorne,, -( 13%*BookValue,, , ) 
T = 1 if year is 1991 
2 if year is 1992 
3 if year is 1993 
4 if year is 1994 
5 if year is 1995 
6 if year is 1996 
b2 = bz, + (bx* T) 
b,, is the nontrendhg EL coefficient for the six year pend 
b,, is the trend component of the EL coefficient for the six year period 
CU = Residuals, asswned to be independcntly,identically distributcd 
Note a 
R2 for pooled GLS eslimates are goodncss-of-fit measures computed by the Buse methocl (White 1993). 
Iafluential and ncgative book value observations omittcd. 
Canadian data are deflaied by a scalc factor, total assets. 
Table 9 (cont.) 
Pooled GLS Estimation 
Trend and Non-trending Components of the EL Coefficient 
Canadian and US Panel Samples ' 
Part B: US s a m ~ l e  (n=228) 
Variable Coefficient 
estimate p-value 
BVX 2.3941 .O000 
EL, non-trending -5.8418 .O000 
EL, trend 0.9523 .O004 
AE 1.7785 .O000 
Constant 6974 1 .IO09 
Model: 
[6] MV,, = bo + bl BVX,, - b2.,ELit - b2.2(ELii + T)+ b, AE,, + e,, 
where, for Company i, 
MV,, = Market value of equity three months aRer year end t 
BVX,, = Book value of equity excluding the accrued environmental liability at year end t 
EL,, = Accrued environmental liability at year end t 
AE,, = Abnormal earnings for the year t 
= Net Incorne,, -( 13%~BookValuei,,-,) 
T = 1 if year is 1991 
2 if year is 1992 
3 if year is 1993 
4 if year is 1994 
5 if year is 1995 
6 if year is 1996 
bz = bl I + (bu* T) 
b, , is the nontrendhg EL coefficient for the six year period 
b,, is the trend componmt of the EL coefficient for the six year period 
eit = Residuals, assurned to be independently,identically distributed 
Note a 
R2 for pooled GLS estimates are goodncss-of-fit measures computed by the Buse method (White 1993). 
Influential and negative book value observations omitted. 
US data are undeflated. 
6.2.4 Robustness checks 
In addition to the analyses used above for mode1 selection purposes in chapter 5, M e r  
ex post robustness checks have been performed on the data. This section summarizes 
these checks. First, the impact of the presence of cross-listed cornpanies in the Canadian 
panel sarnple is investigated. Second, the impact of not omitting influentid andor 
negative book-value observations is discussed. Third, the impact of using different AE 
variable definitions is discussed. 
The analysis of the Canadian sample above does not provide evidence of a significant 
change in the EL coefficient at 1995, the identified tirne of the change in Canadian 
financial reporting standards. One reason for this result could be that the Canadian sarnpie 
contains a mixture of cross-listed companies (that is, companies whose shares are also 
listed on US stock markets) and non-cross-listed companies. It is possible that the cross- 
iisted companies are influenced more by US fuiancial reporting standards than the non- 
cross-listed companies are. Another possibility is that the change in the US standards 
influenced al1 the Canadian companies, not just the cross-listen, perhaps because 
important financial reporting standards that are issued in the US often become part of 
Canadian standards within one or two yem. To study these two questions, the following 
additional testing has been performed. 
The Canadian sample was divided into subsamples of cross-Mers and non-cross-listers 
and re-analyzed to consider the impact of using 1993 as the break point (that is, the 
identified time of the US regulatory change) instead of 1995. To investigate the first 
question, whether the standards may be affecting Canadian cross-listers at the time of the 
US intervention, the cross-lister subsample was analyzed with 1993 versus 1995 break 
points. To investigate the second question, whether al1 the Canadian companies may have 
been affected by the US intervention, the non-cross-lister subsample and the M l  panel 
sample were analyzed to compare the results with 1993 versus 1995 as the transition year. 
Table 10 presents these results. The first and second columns of table 10 show the results 
for the hiIl Canadian panel sample of 36 firms (216 observations), the third and fourth 
columns show the 11 cross-listed companies (66 observations), and the fifth and sixth 
colums show the 25 non-cross-listed companies (1 50 observations). 
For the cross-lister subsample, when the 1995 break point is used the pre-post contrast in 
the EL coefficient is not significant, the same result as for the full Canadian panel sample 
with a 1995 break point. in contrast, when a 1993 break point is used on the cross-listea, 
the pre-post contrast is positive and significant, as was the case for the US sample. This 
result is consistent with the cross-listed companies being influenced by the US 
intervention in 1993, rather than the Canadian intervention in 1995. 
For the non-cross-listers, when a 1995 break point is used the pre-post contrast is not 
significant, the same as for the full Canadian sample with a 1995 break point. When the 
1993 break point is used on the non-cross-listeci subsample (Le. time of US regulatory 
change), the pre-post contrast is positive and significant. This result is consistent with the 
non-cross-listed companies also being influenced by the US intervention in 1993, rather 
than the Canadian intervention in 1995. Finally, the full Canadian panel sample was re- 
analyzed using the 1993 break point. In this case the pre-post contrast is again positive 
and significant, as it was for the cross-listes and non-cross-listers. 
In addition to the information reported in table 10, the post-penod EL coefficient 
estimates (p-values) with 1993 as the break point, as determined by model [3], are as 
follows: 
-2.64 15 (.0578) for full Canadian panel sarnple 
-5.0446 (.0864) for cross-lister subsample 
-0.4364 (.87 15) for non-cross-lister subsarnple 
In cornparison, the model [3] estimate of the post-period EL coefficient for the full 
Canadian panel sarnple, using a 1995 break point, was not significant. 
One possible explanation for these findings is that the 1993 regulatory change in the US 
also had an impact on the Canadian sarnple companies in 1993. Anticipating that similar 
changes would soon occur in Canada, these companies may have changed their behaviour 
in 1993. If this were the case, the change in US standards in 1993 would preempt the later 
change in Canadian standards. That is, most of the change in the environmental liability 
coefficient for the Canadian companies would occur in 1993, and no m e r  significant 
change would be observed in 1995. However, it is also possible that other events in 1993, 
besides the new financial reporting standards, changed investon' perceptions of 
environmental liability valuations W o r  companies' reporting practices for 
environmental liabilities. One possibility for the Canadian setting would be the publicity 
surrounding the Bata Industries (1993) legal decision, which would have raised the 
public's awareness of environmental liabilities; this may have led Canadian companies to 
report better environmental liability estimates. Another possibility is that other events in 
1993 had an impact in both Canada and the US. The replicated time-senes research 
design was intended to nile out this threat, but since the change is observed in both 
groups at the same time, this possibility has not been ruled out by the evidence provided 
here. A further limitation of this cross-lister analysis is that the subsamples are smail. 
Table 10 
Pooled GLS Estimation 
EL Coefficient Estimates for Pre-period and Pre-post Contrast 







(36 companies) (1 1 companies) (25 compaaies) 
1995 break 1993 break 1995 break 1993 break 1995 break 1993 break 
point p i n  t point point point point 
(n=2 16) (n=2 16) (n=66) (1146)  (n= 1 50) (n=150) 
BVX 2.3669 2.3249 3.6253 3.6608 1.6970 1.7835 
EL, pre-period -3.3340 -6.9339 -5.8471 -9.4500 -0.8293 -8.4244 
EL, pre-post 
contrast 1.4314 4.2924 -0.2494 4.4054 ' -1.4839 7.9880 
AE 0.8037 0.7098 0.3504 0.1 395 1.0068 0.8277 
Constant -0.0248 0.0 182 -0.3055 -0.2472 0.2498 0.2097 
where, for Company i, 
MV,, = Market value of equity three months afier year end t 
BV&, = Book value of equity excluding the accrued environmental liability at year end t 
EL,, = Accrued environmental liability at year end t 
AE,, = A b n o m l  eax-nings for the year t 
= Net Incorne,, -( 13%*BookValuei,,.,) 
Dt, = 1 if observation is in the pst-period 
O if observation is in the pre-period 
et, = Residuals, assumed to be independently,identically distnbuted 
Notes 
a - 
R2 for pooled GLS estimates are goodness-of-fit rncasures computed by  the Buse mcthod (White 1993). 
Negative book vaIut observations omitted. 
Data are deflated by a scale factor, total assets. 
b - significance level, p c -01 
c - significance level, p < -05 
The second robustness check considers the impact of outlier data in the analyses. It 
compares the results with and without sarnple companies that have highly influential 
observations or negative book values during the study penod. For the Canadian sarnple, 
this check was done assurning a 1993 break point, because the cross-lister test above 
indicated that this break point is more consistent with the data than the 1995 break point. 
There was only one company with negative book values in the Canadian sample. Whether 
or not the observations for this Company are included rnakes very little difference to the 
results as reported above in tables 7, 8 and 9. 
For the US sarnple, there are two companies with negative book values and one company 
with highly influential observations dunng the study penod. Whether or not these outlier 
observations are omitted makes very little difference to any of the results presented above 
in tables 7 and 9. The results of the year-by-year analysis reported in table 8 also do not 
appear to be sensitive to whether or not the company with infiuential observations is 
inc luded. However, some estimates and signi ficance levels of the year-by-year 
coefficients in table 8 do change when the companies with negative book-value 
observations are included." This sensitivity may be due io the fact that the year-by-year 
mode1 lacks statistical power because nine parameters are being estimated h m  a 
relatively srnall sample ( les  than 250 observations). Despite this sensitivity to negative 
book-value observations in the year-by-year analysis, the overall conclusion that the EL 
coefncient is becomhg more positive over the sîudy penod is still supported by the data 
j9 For example, instead of 199 1, 1992 and 1994 being significant, 199 1, 1995 and 1996 are sigmficant. 
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The third robustness check investigates the impact of different AE variable definitions. 
Instead of a discount rate of 13%, discount rates ranging frorn 7% to 16% were used to 
calculate AE. Also, net income was used instead of the computed AE value. Using any of 
these alternate AE variable definitions makes very M e  difference to the results shown in 
tables 7, 8 and 9. 
To sumrnarize the robustness checks, the cross-lister robustness check indicates a 
significant positive contrast at 1993, rather than 1995, in the Canadian sample data This 
could indicate that the standards promulgated by the SEC in the US in 1993 also 
influenced Canadian public companies, thus preempting the Canadian standards that were 
issued later in 1995. The outlien robustness check indicates that the pre-post analysis 
(table 7) and the trend analysis (table 9) are not sensitive to omission of influential and 
negative book-value observations. The year-by-year analysis (table 8) is not sensitive to 
influential observations, but it does appear to be sensitive to data with negative book 
values. This sensitivity limits the conclusiveness of the year-by-year results. Ail the 
analyses were found to be insensitive to how the AE variable is defhed. Overail, al1 the 
robustness checks support the conclusion that the EL coefficient becomes less negative 
over the study period. As a caveat, the results are sensitive to scale effects and methods of 
deflation, as discussed in section 5.3.3. 
6.2.5 Sumrnary of change in financial reporting standards analysis 
This section has presented analyses of the pre-period to post-penod change in the EL 
coeficient, the year-by-year EL coefficients and the trend in the EL coefficient over the 
study penod. The pre-post analysis indicates that a significant positive change in the EL 
coefficient occun at the hypothesized tirne in the US sample. This does not support the 
research hypothesis, which states that this contrast will be negative. The Canadian 
contrast estimates are also positive, but not significant when a 1995 break point is used. 
When the 1993 break point is used, however, the Canadian results are similar to those of 
the US. There is also evidence that the coefficient itself is negative throughout the study 
period. The replicated research design was intended to increase our ability to infer that the 
change in the EL coefficient is associated with the change in standards rather than the 
manifestation of other, general trends in the market valuation of environmental liabilities. 
Since the ernpirical results for the Canadian data also indicate that a change occurred in 
1993, the study's ability to rule out this possibility is limited. 
6.3 Discussion of results 
This section provides a discussion and offers a possible interpretation of the study's 
ernpirical results. The study has found evidence consistent with a positive change in the 
EL coefficient at the time of the US regulatory intervention, 1993. The results outlined 
above do not support the study's directional hypothesis. In particular, while a negative 
contrast in the EL coefficient was hypothesized from theory, the study provides evidence 
that this contrast was positive and significant. 
A failure to find evidence consistent with the alternative hypothesis does not 
automatically imply acceptance of the nul1 hypothesis. As pointed out in Cook and 
Campbell (1979), there are two possible interpretations of not rejecting the nuil. One, the 
theory implied by the altemate hypothesis may be me ,  but the ernpirical tests lacked the 
power to detect the hypothesized effect. Two, the hypothesized effect was not obtained 
under the conditions in which the testing occurred (or, more simply put, the theory 
implied by the alternate hypothesis may be false.) This interpretation can be made with 
more confidence when, as in this study, '... an explicit directional hypothesis guides the 
research and the results are statistically significant and in the opposite direction to that 
specified in the hypothesis.' (Cook and Campbell 1979: 45). 
Thus, it is reasonable to consider the possibility that the theory underlying the research 
hypothesis is inadequate. For example, it may be that a strong suppressor variable is 
offsetting a weaker, tnie e k t  in the hypothesized direction. For this study, one such 
suppressor factor is suggested by new theoretical research by Fischer and Venecchia 
(1998), first presented after the present study's ernpirical results were obtained. This new 
theory suggests that one possible way to interpret the results would be to consider the 
potential for the reported environmental liability estimates to be biased. This potential 
bias interpretation is discussed below. 
An important assumption in the Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) model underlying the 
study's hypothesis is that the mean of the tnie distribution of the profit is known, and 
equals the mean of the reported profit estimate. In other words, the model assumes there 
is no bias in the report or in the investors' pnors. Consistent with Holthausen and 
Verrecchia (1988) and other theoretical work available when the present study was 
conducted, the research hypothesis is based on the assumption of no bias. However, 
recent work by Fisher and Verrecchia (1998) in an asyrnrnetric information setting shows 
that it may be an equilibrium strategy for managers to provide biased information. 
Fisher and Verrecchia (1998) present an equilibrium model of reporting bias in which 
investors do not know whether the manager's hancial reporting objective is to inflate or 
deflate share pnce, so that they cannot perfectly adjust for the bias in the manager's 
report. These authors find that the value relevance of the manager's report decreases with 
the extent to which it is biased. Comparative static results suggest that the value relevance 
of the manager's report falls as the cost of biasing the report falls or the uncertainty about 
the manager's objective increases. This presents the possibility that, in contrast to the 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) model, the mean of the estimate can differ 
systematically fiom the true mean, that is, it can be biased. 
For the levels specification used in this study, the potential for the estimate to be biased is 
important to consider. In puticular, if the investors' pnors are that the estimate is biased, 
their attempt to compensate for bias may lead them to place a value on the liability that is 
closer to theu beliefs, and that differs nom the number the Company reports in its 
financial statements. For example, if a company reported that its environmental liability 
was one dollar, but investors believed this was understated, they would be valuing the 
company as though its environmental liability were more than one dollar, Say 10 dollars. 
in a regression model, this bias correction would translate into a coefficient on EL that is 
more negative than negative one, say -10. Thus, a possible interpretation of these 
empincal results is that they reflect the influence of bias, a factor that was omitted fkom 
the study's ex ante theoretical prediction. The results may indicate that bias is a powerfil 
suppressor variable that acts in the opposite direction to precision. As noted, the 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) theory considers the impact of changes in the precision 
of a report while assuming that bias has no effect. In view of t h ,  one possible 
interpretation of the results might be obtained by considering the opposite case to 
Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988), that is, the case in which only b i s  matters and 
precision has no effect. 
While the magnitude of any possible bias effect would be difficult to explain in this 
study, the direction of the effect observed here might be explaincd as follows. Note that 
the intent of the new financial reporting standards is to increase the cost to the company 
of not providing a reasonable environmental liability estimate. These regulatory costs 
could take the form of additional monitoring or sanctions such as an adverse audit report. 
Thus lack of standards can be construed as a 'low cost of not estimating' regime. If there 
is a low expected regulatory cost, a company would have little incentive to incu. the cost 
of an extensive investigation of its sites. If a company leaves some polluted sites 
uninvestigated, or only tests for a few of the many possible pollutants, an understated 
liability estimate rnay result. When standards are increased, more effort may result in 
more sites and more pollutants being identified and thus l e s  understatement of the 
environmental liability estimate. 
Further, GAAP for contingent liabilities require that, if no esthate in a range of 
estimates is more likely than any other, the minimum value in the range should be 
accrued (for example, FASB Interpretation No. 14 to FAS No.5). This particular GAAP 
provides a link between the estimation effort and the investors' pnors regarding bias, as 
follows. If little effort is expended, it is more probable that no estimate in the range will 
be better than any other, therefore a GAAP-induced downward bias will result. If more 
estimation effort is applied, it is more probable that companies can key in on a most- 
likely arnount in the range, and so more companies would be reporting an amount other 
than the minimum. Thus, investon' prion may be that the idormation reported is, on 
average, less undentated after standards are raised and more effort is applied to the 
estimation process. 
Investors with pnors that the estimated environmental liability is understateci might 
correct for this by placing a value on the liability that is more negative than negative one, 
Say -5 times or -10 times, depending on how severe they believed the understatement 
bias to be. Ifa less undentated estimate were reported, the investors' valuation would be 
closer to the theoretical value of the negative one. Therefore, it might be expected that the 
conection for bias would become smaller under the higher financial reporting standards, 
and thus the valuation coefficient would become less negative. The above discussion 
indicates that bias correction could be a factor that acts in the opposite direction to the 
study's research hypothesis and, if so, it would work against observing the hypothesized 
result. 
To summarize, the original research hypothesis assumed that bias has no effect and only 
the precision of the report matters. This led to the expectation that the contrast nom low 
to high standards will be a negative movement from a coefficient of zero to a coefficient 
of negative one. In contrast, if investors expect the report to be an understated amount 
and they believe this bias is reduced when standards are raised, and if one assumes 
changes in precision would have no effect, this could explain the observed result. That is, 
we observe a positive movement from a coefficient less than negative one in the low 
standards period, up towards negative one in the high standards period. 
The figure below illustrates these situations. 
Noise reduction 
(no bias effect) 
Bias correction <---------- 
(no precision effect) 
Along the lines argued in chaptet 3 (section 3.4), note that in an association study such as 
this, an environmental liability valuation coefficient closer to negative one could be 
interpreted as an indication that the reported information is less biased. That is, we can 
say the number on the balance sheet has corne to resemble more closely the information 
the investors are using, and this will be the case regardless of changes in investors' 
beliefs. However, we cannot Say anything about the source of these beliefs based on an 
association study. 
Viewed in light of the study's empirical results, the new theory regarding biased reporting 
and the discussion above point to a different theoretical approach to the research problem, 
one that is closer to what might be considered an 'ideal' research design for a quasi- 
expenmental setting. In such an ideal design, competing theoretical predictions are put 
foward as two altemate hypotheses. The alternative hypotheses are stnictured such that 
finding evidence consistent with one of the hypotheses simultaneously refutes the other. 
Here the alternatives are a bias-correction theory and a noise-effect theory, the fiat 
implying the pre-post change in EL will be positive, the second implying it will be 
negative. For this study such an ideal design can only be put forward in hindsight, but it 
does provide an interesting way to view the empirical results. 
6.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented empirical analyses indicating that the market places a negative 
valuation on environmental liabilities. Results for the US sample are consistent with this 
coefficient becoming less negative after the regulatory change in 1993. The Canadian 
sample also indicates a change to a less negative coefficient; this change is not significant 
when 1995 is used as the effective date of the regulatory change, but it is significant when 
1993 (the time of the US change) is used. This may indicate the US standards also 
influenced the companies in the Canadian sarnple, thus preempting the Canadian 
standards that were issued Iater. Notably, these results are significant but opposite to the 
directional research hypothesis. The US data also indicate a general trend to a less 
negative value over the study period. The Canadian results are less conclusive because 
the coefficient estimates not highly significant. The potential for repoxting bias to be an 
omitted factor that works in the opposite direction to the hypothesized precision effect 
was explored as one possible theoretical interpretation of the results. 
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the environmental liability valuation coefficient 
having a negative value that becomes less negative during the study penod. However, 
conclusive results were not obtained in both settings of the replicated, interrupted time- 
series design. Since the replication was intended to control against the threat of omitted 
factors, the study does not provide strong evidence that could rule out the possibility that 
the obsewed contrast is due to a change in 1993 in some other factor besides the new 
financial reporting standards. 
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Overall, evidence has been obtained that the market places a negative valuation on 
environmental liabilities. Results for the US sample indicate a significant, positive change 
in this coeficient at the time of the regulatory change, 1993. This evidence is not 
consistent with the hypothesis that the environmental liability valuation coemcient will 
move in a negative direction, fiom zero closer to its theoretical value of negative one, 
when higher financial reporting standards are in place. In contrast, the coefficient was 
found to be less than negative one in the pre-period, and the change in the coefficient 
between the pre-period and the post-penod was found to be positive. One interpretation 
offered For this result is that investors may be correcting a perceived understatement bias 
in the reported environmental liability estimates, and they believe that this bias is less 
severe in the post-period than in the pre-penod. This interpretation would indicate that the 
new standards were effective, but not in the way hypothesized. The results for the 
Canadian sample do not indicate that a signîficant change occurred in the EL coefficient 
at 1995, the identified time of change in the Canadian financial reporting standards. 
Robustness checks on these results indicate that a significant, positive change does occur 
in this coefficient at the sarne tirne as the US regulatory change, 1993. This result would 
be consistent with the US standards also being effective for Canadian companies, thus 
preempting the Canadian standards that were introduced later. As in the US case, this 
evidence is not consistent with the research hypothesis concerning the direction of the 
pre-post change. However, other interpretations of these results are possible. For 
example, the observed change at 1993 may be due to some unidentified change in the 
market's infornation set, which occurred around 1993 and changed how investors value, 
or companies report, environmental liabilities in both Canada and the US. 
The trend analyses also suggest a general trend to a less negative valuation coefficient 
over the study penod. This result also opposes the research hypothesis but it is, again, 
consistent with the new standards being effective. The Canadian results are generally less 
conclusive since the Canadian trend coefficient estimate is insignificant. Thus, the 
possibility that the observed pre-post change reflects a continua1 change due to other 
factors than the new financial reporting standards has not been specifically ruled out. 
Some M e r  limitations of the analyses are as follows. In general, the levels mode1 used 
in the study is vulnerable to omitted variables that may be correlated with EL. An omitted 
factor, reporting bias, that acts in the opposite direction to the hypothesized precision 
effect, has been suggested as a possible explanation for the study results. Existing 
research on the impact of bias in financial reporting is limited. Future research could be 
directed towards developing formal means of measuring reporting bis. Recent work by 
Chen (1998), first presented afier the present study was completed, has studied the bias in 
reported environmental liabilities. The Chen (1998) study used the method of modeling 
conservative accounting set out in Feltham and Ohlson (1995) as a basis for measuring 
bias in environmental liability reports." 
There may also be other relevant variables that have not been identified and addressed in 
the present study. Other value relevant information could corne £tom knowing what type 
of environrnental liability is being reported. For example, some environrnental liabilities 
are the 'site-restoration' type, which are not fblly recognized. Instead, these are added to 
the balance sheet liability balance over time as resources are extracted fiom the site. This 
may indicate the booked liability is an understatement of the ultimate cash outflow. A 
simple way to capture this would be to divide the sample into resource and non-resource 
companies. This approach is suggested by the 'other information' variable in the Feltham 
and Ohlson (1995) model, and was used by Arnir (1993) to study post-retirement benefit 
liability valuation. Ideally, a larger sample would be used for this purpose. More robust 
econometric techniques might be developed for analyzing incomplete panels of cross- 
sectional time-series data that would allow larger samples to be analyzed. The accounting 
used for site-restoration liabilities might also be modeled more explicitly, for example by 
using the expanded valuation model presented in Feltham and Ohlson (1997); this model 
formally incorporates the structure of amortization accounting, and might be adapted to 
address site-restoration accounting. 
In summary, this thesis has presented evidence that changes in financial reporting 
standards are associated with changes in the market valuation of environmental liabilities. 
The empirical results are generally opposite to the study's ex ante predictions. One 
interpretation of the results is that investon believe the standards have the ef5ect of 
reducing an understatement bias in environrnental liability estimates. The thesis 
'O Thc Chcn (1998) study ciiffers from this thesis in that it considers the relation between othcr information 
discloscd in annual reports and the market's valuation of environmental liabilitics during the period 1992 to 
contnbutes to Our stock of knowledge conceming the role of financial reporting standards 
in the reporting and valuation of environmental liabi li ty estimates, and suggests several 
avenues for future research. 
- - - - - - 
1995. It does not examine changes in the valuation over t h e ,  as this study does. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 




August 1978 CICA Handbook section 3290 'Contingencies'. 
This standard requires: 
(.12) accrual of a contingent loss if a loss is likely and amount is 
reasonably determinable 
(AS) disclosure of a contingent loss if a loss is likely but amount 
carmot be reasonably determined, or if loss is likely and amount 
accmed but there is exposure to loss in excess of the amount 
accmed, or if the probability of loss is not deteminable 
(.22) the disclosure should include the nature of the contingency 
and an estimate of the contingent loss or a statement that such an 
estimate cannot be made. 
Nov t O, 1989; The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) Policy Statement 
amended 5.10 'Annual Information Form and Management's Discussion 
March 9,1990 and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations - 
Policies' 
Eflective for fiscal years ending on or after September 30, 1990 for 
companies with revenues or shareholders' equity greater than 
$25,000,000 or December 3 1, 1989 for other companies. Part XII, 
Item 1 (e) requires companies to: 
'Disclose information on risks and uncertainties facing the Issuer ... 
Discuss and analyze risks, events and uncertainties that would cause 
reportai hancial information not necessarily to be indicative of 
future operating results or of hitue financial condition.' 
Part 1(7) States: 
'There is no regdatory requirement for auditor involvement with 
respect to the preparation of the AIF and MD&A. However, Issuers 
rnay choose to involve their auditors. The auditing profession's 
standards rnay require limited auditor involvement in certain 
circumstances such as where MD&A accompanies an Issuer's 
audited hancial statements. 
APPENDIX 1 (cont) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmeotaf Liabilities 
CANADA 
December 1, CICA Handbook section 3060 'Capital Assets' 
1990 Effective for years cornmencing on or af€er this date. It States: 
(.39) ' m e n  reasonabiy deteminable, provision should be made for 
future removal and site restoration costs, net of expecied 
recoveries, in a rational and systematic manner by charges to 
income.' 
(.63) 'Additional desirable disclosures include: 
(a) accumulated provision for future removal and site restoration 
costs and the major assurnptions used and the basis for deiermining 
the provision; and (b) the arnount of the future removal and site 
restoration costs charged to income for the period.' 
January 29, OSC Bulletin (16 OSCB 379, 'A Guide to OSC Policy 
1993 Statement 5.10' 
This bulletin was issued because OSC cornpliance reviews of 
MD&A in 1990 and 199 1 indicated that the quality of information 
being provided to market participants was inconsistent. As a result 
of this situation, in 1992 the OCS undertook a broad review of the 
1991 MD&A of 240 of the TSE 300 companies. The Guide is 
intended to assist issuers and their advisors in the preparation of 
more effective narrative financial disclosure. Among other things, 
the Guide clarifies that 'risks and uncertainties' may include 
environmental risks, e ffec ts O P government policy and legislative 
developments, and effects of contingencies (p. 1 1). 
February 1993 CICA Exposure Draft - 'Contingent Liabüities' 
Provides revised accounting recommendations regarding contingent 
liabilities (section 3290). The Exposure Draft was withdrawn in 
1996. 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relatiog to Environmental Liabilities 
CANADA 
Jan 1994 CICA Handbook Audit Guideline 19 (AuG19) 'Audit of 
Revised Dec Finuicial Staternents Mected by Environmental Matters' 
1994 to reflect This standard provides guidance on application of GAAS to 
release of hancial statements when they may be affecteci by environmental 
S. 5 136 (see matters, under the headings: 'Planning considerations', 
below) 'Circumstances which rnay make the auditor suspect the financial 
statements are materially misstated', 'Using the work of a specialist' 
and 'Examples of audit procedures.' 
January 1, CICA Handbook section 5136 'Misstatements - IUegal Acts' 
1995 Effective for years commencing on or afier this date, this standard 
States: 
'The auditor should apply his or her knowledge of the entity's 
business and make enquiries of management to identiS, laws and 
regulations which, if violated, could reasonably be expected to 
result in a material misstatement in the financial statements.' 
(5136.1 1) 
'The auditor should enquire of and obtain a written representation 
fiom management to confirm that either: 
a) management is not aware of any illegal or possible illegal acts: 
b) management has disclosed to the auditor al1 fats related to 
illegal or possibly illegal acts.' (5 126.3 1) 
'When the auditor has obtained evidence which indicates an illegal 
or possibly illegal act, other than one considered inconsequential, 
may have occurrecl, the auditor should ensure the audit cornmittee 
and other appropriate levels of management are informed.' 
(5 136.28) 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmental Liabilities 
CANADA 
July 1995 CICA Handbook section 1508 'Measurement Uncertainty'. 
It requires: 
(.06) disclosure of the nature of a material measurement uncertainty 
(.07) disclosure of the extent of a material measurement uncertainty 
when it is reasonably possible that the recognized amount could 
change by a matenal amount in the near term (i.e. within one year) 
(.08) the recognized amount of the measurernemt uncertainty 
disclosed under .O6 or .O7 should be disclosed except when 
disclosure of the amount would have a significant adverse effect on 
the enterprise. The rasons for non-disclosure should be indicated. 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmental Liabilities 
March FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. S 
1975 'Accounting for Contingencies' (FAS No. 5) 
This standard requires companies to recognize an estimated loss From 
a loss contingency by a charge to income when both of the following 
conditions are met: 
(1) It is 'probable' (i.e. a future event is likely to occur) that an asset 
has been impaired or liability has been incurred at the financial 
statement date, and 
(2) The arnount of the loss can be reasonably estimated 
Disclosure is required of the nature and amount of a contingent loss 
accrual, of reasonably possible losses in excess of the amount 
accrued, and in situations when the company cannot estimate the 
range of reasonably possible outcornes. 
1976 FASB Interpretation No. 14 (FIN 14) 
This standard applies if a company determines it has a probable loss 
but c m  only estimate a range of losses, not a point estimate. FIN 14 
requires that if an estimated loss falls within a range of possible 
amounts the company should accrue the best estimate in the range, or 
if no amount is better than any other the minimum should be accrued. 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmental Liabilities 
1988 AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards no. 54 'Illegal Acts by 
Clients' (SAS 54) 
Requires auditors to make inquiries of management conceming a 
company's compliance with environmental laws and regulations, 
even though these may have only an 'indirect' or contingent effect on 
financial statement amounts rather than a direct and material effect. 
Wntten representation should be obtained conceming the absence of 
violations or possible violations of laws and regulations. Ultimate 
detemination of illegality must be obtained through legal advice or 
by a court of law, however. 
1989 and SEC Regulation S-K - Reporting requirements for SEC 
various later registran ts. 
additions Item 101 requires a description of the business, including specific 
disclosure of matenal effects that compliance with environmental 
laws may have on the registrant's capital expenditures, earnings and 
cornpetitive position. 
Item 103 requires disclosure of any material pending legd 
proceedings under environmental laws. 
Item 303 sets out MD&A requirements; MD&A must include 
forward-looking disclosures triggered by any known trends, demands, 
commitments, events or uncrrtainties that are reasonably likely to 
have a material effect on the registrant's operating results or financial 
condition. 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmental Liabilities 
1991 AICPA Audit Risk Nert  
This annual AKPA guideline for auditors indicated that auditors 
should consider whether a client has been designated as a 'potentially 
responsible party (PM)' under environmental law or if it has a high 
risk of environmental liabilities and consider any financial statement 
implications of such matters. It provides a list of 'red flags' that may 
be indicators of increased environmental liability risks. 
January AICPA Statement on Auditing Standards no. 69 (SAS 69) 'The 
1992 Meaning of 'Present Fairly in Conformity witb GeneraUy 
Accepted Accounting Principles' in the Independent Auditor's 
Report' 
This standard identifies the sources of established generally accepted 
accounting principles ( G W )  and their hierarchy of authority. The 
highest category, category (a) includes FASB statements and AICPA 
research bulletins. Category @) includes AICPA's AcSEC 
(Accounting Standards Executive Cornmittee) SOPs and audit and 
accounting guides. Category (c) includes FASB Emerging Issues 
Task Force (EITF) consensuses and AcSEC practice bulletins. 
1993 FASB Emerging Issues Task Force Issue no. 93-5 (EITF 93-5) 
'Accounting for Environmental Liabilities' 
EITF 93-5 allows environmental liabilities to be reduced by probable 
recoveries. (EITF 93-5 is superceded for SEC registrants by SAB 92 - 
see below- which does not allow offsetting.) Discounting is allowed, 
but not required, only if the aggregate amount of the obligation and 
the timing and amounts of cash payments are fixed or reasonably 
determinable. If the liability is discounted, any recovery m u t  also be 
discounted. If the discounthg effect is material, the effect and the 
discount rate should be disclosed. The EITF did not address balance 
sheet presentation of environmental liabilities or the appropnate 
discount rate to be used 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmental Liabilities 
January AiCPA Environmental Issues Rouodtable 
1993 Representatives of the AICPA, FASB, SEC, CICA and industiy 
CPAs convened to discuss accounting and auditing problems relating 
to environmental issues. The AICPA project that ultimately resulted 
in SOP 96-1 in 1996 (described below) was initiated. The 
applicability of SAS no. 54 to auditors' responsibility to detect non- 
cornpliance with environmental laws was noted, but also the need for 
more specific guidance on environment-related financial statement 
assertions. 
June 1993 SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92 (SAB 92) 
Sets out the SEC Staffs interpretation of GAAP with regard to 
contingent liabilities, in particular environmental liabilities. Its 
purpose is to promote timely recognition of contingent losses and to 
address the diversity in practice with respect to accounting for and 
disclosure of environmental liabilities which the SEC found 
unacceptable. SABs are administrative interpretations and principles 
rather than official niles of the SEC, however they do provide insight 
into the kinds of deficiencies likely to result in SEC enforcement 
actions - a costly and undesirable outcome for registrants. 
Three key requirements of SAB 92 are: 
(1) Contingent liabilities must be displayed on balance sheet 
separately ~ o m  any recovenes recognized (no offsetting) 
(2) Discounting of an environmental liability for a specific site is 
only appmpriate under the conditions noted in EIFT 93-5. In addition, 
the discount rate must be no higher than the rate on risk-free 
monetary assets with a manuity correspondhg to the expected cash 
payments. 
(3) Disclosure is expected to follow strictly FASB SFAS No. 5 and 
Interpretation No. 14, in particular the requirement to accrue the best 
estimate in a range even if a point estimate is uncertain. In the SAB 
the Staff note that zero is unlikely to be the 'best estimate in the 
range' if a known liability exists, and state that it will not accept lack 
of certainty as an argument for a failure to provide investon with al1 
material factors relating to contingent liabilities. 
APPENDIX 1 (cont.) 
Event Line and Descriptions of Canadian and US Financial Reporting Standards 
Relating to Environmental Liabilities 
October AICPA Statement of Position 96-1 (SOP 96-1) 'Environmental 
1996 Remediation Liabilities (Including Audithg Guidance)' 
This statement reinforces FASB 5 requirements, provides details of 
the costs to be included in the environmental liability accrual, states 
how to address sharing of responsibility with other parties, states that 
current laws and technology should be used in environmental liability 
measurements, allows discounting under specific conditions, gives 
guidance on disclosure and provides guidance for auditors on 
planning, executing and reporting for engagements in which 
environmental liabilities exist. Effective December 1996. 
Sources: 
Arnerican Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) 1996. 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) 1997. 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 1996. 
Fleming 1993. 
Gagnon-Valotaire and Chlala 1993. 
Price, Waterhouse 1994. 





List of Sample Companies 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sarnple Cornpanies 
COMPANY NAME 
CANADIAN COMPANIES 








ARC MTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
ARC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
ARC MTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
ARC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 
ARC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION 







CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES LMTED 
CANADIAN N A m L  RESOURCES LIMITED 
CANADIAN NATURAL RESOüRCES LIMITED 
CANADIAN NATURAL RESOüRCES LIMITED 
CANADIAN NATURAL RESOURCES LIMITED 








CATHEDRAL GOLD CORPORATION 
CATHEDRAL GOLD CORPORATION 
CATHEDRAL GOLD CORPORATION 
CATHEDRAL GOLD CORPORATION 
CATHEDRAL GOLD CORPORATION 
CATHEDRAL GOLD CORPORATION 
CHAWCO RESOURCES LTD 
CHAUVCO RESOURCES LTD 
CHAWCO RESOURCES LTD 
CHAWCO RESOUP.CES LTD 
CHAUVCO RESOURCES LTD 





Z Z Z  






























SHELL CANADA LIMlTED 
SHELL CANADA LIMITED 
SHELL CANADA LIMITED 
SHELL CANADA LiMITED 
SHELL CANADA L M T E D  
















UNITED TRI-STAR RESOURCES 
UNITED TRI-STAR RESOURCES 
YEAR END 
961231 





















95 123 1 








93 123 1 
92123 1 













93 123 1 
921231 
91 123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sarnple Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
UNITED TRI-STAR RESOURCES 
UNITED TRI-STAR RESOURCES 
UNITED TRI-STAR RESOURCES 
UNITED TRI-STAR RESOURCES 
TARRAGON OIL AND GAS LiMITED 
TARRAGON OIL AND GAS LIMITED 
TARRAGON OIL AND GAS LIMITED 
TARRAGON OIL AM> GAS LIMITED 
TARRAGON OIL AND GAS LlMITED 












CANADUN COMPANIES, CONT 
ADDITIONAL COMPANIES - INCOMPLETE OR LESS THAN 1996-1 PANELS 
AGRIUM MC (was COMMCO FERT.) 
ALCAN 
ANDERSON EXPLORATION LTD 
ANDERSON EXPLORATION LTD 
ANDERSON EXPLORATION LTD 
ANDERSON EXPLORATION LTD 
ANDERSON EXPLORATiON LTD 
AT PLASTICS INC 
AT PLASTICS iNC 
AT PLASTICS MC 
ATLANTIS RESOURCES LTD 
ATLANTIS RESOURCES LTD 
ATLANTIS RESOURCES LTD 
ATLANTIS RESOURCES LTD 
AUR RESOURCES MC 
AUR RESOURCES MC 
AUR RESOURCES MC 
A m  RESOURCES lNC 
AVENOR MC 
AVENOR MC 
BACA RESOURCES LTD 
BACA RESOURCES LTD 
BACA RESOURCES LTD 
BACKER PETROLEUM CORP 
BACKER PETROLEUM CORP 
B A m R  PETROLEUM CORP 
BARRMGTON PETROLEUM LTD 
BARRMGTON PETROLEUM LTD 
BAEUZMGTON PETROLEUM LTD 
BARRMGTON PETROLEUM LTD 
BARRINGTON PETRûLEUM LTD 
BATTLE CREEK DEVELOPMENTS LTD 
BA'iTLE CREEK DEVELOPMENTS LTD 
BC SUGAR REFlNERY LiMiTED 
BC SUGAR REFTNERY LIMITED 
BC SUGAR REFMERY LIMITED 
BC SUGAR REFMERY LIMITED 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Cornpanies 
COMPANY NAME 
BEAU CANADA EXPLORATION LTD 
BEAU CANADA EXPLORATION LTD 
BEAU CANADA EXPLORATION LTD 
BEAU CANADA EXPLORATION LTD 
BEAU CANADA EXPLORATION LTD 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BEMA GOLD CORP 
BLUE RANGE RESOüRCE CORPORATION 
BLUE RANGE RESOURCE CORPORATION 
BLUE RANGE RESOüRCE CORPORATION 
BLüE RANGE RESOCTRCE CORPORATION 
BLUE RANGE RESOURCE CORPORATION 
BLüE RANGE RESOURCE CORPORATION 
BOW VALLEY ENERGY MC 
BOW VALLEY MDUSTRIES LTD 
BOW VALLEY MDUSTRIES LTD 
BOW VALLEY MDUSTRIES LTD 
BOW VALLEY MDUSTRIES LTD 
BOWTEX ENERGY (CANADA) CORP 
BOWTEX ENERGY (CANADA) CORP 
BRASCADE RESOURCES MC 
BRASCADE RESOURCES MC 




BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MTNES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
BRENDA MMES LTD 
BRENDA MINES LTD 
CABER EXPLORATION LTD 
CABER EXPLORATION LTD 
CABER EXPLORATION LTD 
CABER EXPLORATION LTD 








95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
91 123 1 








































96 123 1 
961231 
95 123 1 
94123 1 
93 123 1 
93 123 1 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES MC 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES iNC 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES MC 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES MC 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES MC 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES MC 
CAMPBELL RESOURCES MC 
CANADA SOUTHERN PETROLEUM LTD 
CANADA SOüTHERN PETROLEUM LTD 
CANADA SOUTHERN PETROLEUM LTD 
CANADA SOUTHERN PETROLEUM LTD 
CANADA SOUTHERN PETROLEUMLTD 
CANADA TUNGSTEN INC 
CANADA TUNGSTEN INC 
CANADA TUNGSTEN INC 
CANADA TUNGSTEN INC 
CANADA TUNGSTJ2N MC 
CANADA TüNGSTEN MC 
CANADA TUNGSTEN MC 
CANADA TUNGSTEN INC 
CANADA TLMGSTEN MC 
CANADA TUNGSTEN INC 
CANADA TLMGSTEN MC 
CANADIAN 88 ENERGY CORP 
CANADIAN 88 ENERGY CORP 
CANADIAN 88 ENERGY CORP 
CANADiAN 88 ENERGY CORP 
CANADiAN JOREX LIMITED 
CANADIAN JOREX LlMITED 
CANADIAN JOREX LiMITED 
CANADiAN JOREX LIMITED 
CANADiAN PACIFIC 
CANFOR CORP 
CHANNEL RESOURCES LTD 
CHANNEL RESOURCES LTD 
CIMARRON PETROLEUM LTD 
CIMARRON PETROLEUM LTD 
CIMARRON PETROLEUM LTD 
CIMARRON PETROLEUM LTD 
CIMARRON PETROLEUM LTD 
CIMARRON PETROLEUM LTD 
CiTADEL GOLD MINES MC 
CITADEL GOLD MINES INC 
CITADEL GOLD MINES WC 
CLAUDE RESOURCES INC 
CLAUDE RESOURCES INC 
CLAUDE RESOURCES MC 
CLAUDE RESOURCES INC 
CLAUDE RESOURCES mc 
CLAUDE RESOURCES MC 
CO-ENERCO RESOURCES LTD 
YEAR END 
93 123 1 
921231 












































95 123 1 
94123 1 
93123 1 
92 123 1 
931231 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
CO-ENERCO RESOURCES LTD 
CO-ENERCO RESOURCES LTD 
CO-MAXX ENERGY GROUP MC 
CO-MAXX ENERGY GROUP [NC 
CO-MAXX ENERGY GROUP MC 
COGAS ENERGY LiMITED 
COGAS ENERGY LIMITED 
COMINCO FERTILJZERS LTD 
COMMCO FERTILEERS LTD 
CONSOLIDATED NEVADA GOLDFIELDS 
CONSOLIDATED NEVADA GOLDFIELDS 
CONSOLIDATED NEVADA GOLDFIELDS 
CONWEST EXPLORATION COMPANY LiMiTED 
CONWEST EXPLORATION COMPANY LIMITED 
CONWEST EXPLORATION COMPANY LiMITED 
CONWEST EXPLORATION COMPANY LIMITED 
CORNUCOPIA RESOURCES LTD 
CORNUCOPIA RESOURCES LTD 
CORNUCOPLA RESOURCES LTD 
CORNUCOPLA RESOURCES LTD 
CORNUCOPIA RESOURCES LTD 
CZAR RESOURCES LTD 
CZAR RESOURCES LTD 
CZAR RESOURCES LTD 
CZAR RESOURCES LTD 
CZAR RESOURCES LTD 
DENBRIDGE CAPITAL CORPORATION 
DENBRIDGE CAPITAL CORPORATION 
DEVRAN PETROLEUM LTD 
DEVRAN PETROLEUM LTD 
DEVRAN PETROLEUM LTD 
DISCOVERY WEST CORP 
DISCOVERY WEST CORP 
DISCOVERY WEST CORP 
DISCOVERY WEST CORP 
ELAN ENERGY INC 
ELAN ENERGY MC 
ELAN ENERGY MC 
ELAN ENERGY iNC 
ELAN ENERGY lNC 







ENCAL ENERGY LTD 
ENCAL ENERGY LTD 
ENCAL ENERGY LTD 
ENCAL ENERGY LTD 
YEAR END 
92123 1 




93 123 1 
92123 1 
94123 1 





93 123 1 
92123 1 
91 123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92123 1 
94123 1 
93 123 1 
921231 
91 123 1 
90123 1 
94123 1 























93 123 1 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sarnple Companies 
COMPANY NAME 




ENERPLUS RESOURCES CORPORATION 
ENERPLUS RESOURCES CORPORATION 
ENERPLUS RESOURCES CORPORATION 
ENERPLUS RESOüRCES CORPORATION 
EQUITY SILVER MINES LiMITED 
EQUITY SILVER MINES LIMITED 
EQUITY SILVER M I N E S  LIMITED 
EQUITY SILVER MINES LUlITED 
EQUITY SILVER M M E S  LIMITED 
EQUITY SlLVER M W E S  LIMITED 
EQUITY SILVER MINES LIMITED 
EQUITY SILVER M M E S  LIMITED 
ESPALAU M C  
FORTUNE ENERGY MC 
FORTUNE ENERGY MC 
FORTUNE ENERGY MC 
FORTUNE ENERGY MC 
GIBRALTAR MNES LIMITED 
GIBRALTAR MMES LIMITED 
GIBRALTAR MMES LIMITED 
GIBRALTAR MMES LIMITED 
GIBRALTAR MINES LiMITED 
GIBRALTAR MINES LIMITED 
GIBRALTAR MTNES LMITED 
GOLDCORP INC 
GOLDCORP INC 
GOLDCORP W C  
GOLDCORP N C  
GOLDCORP WC 
GRANGER ENERGY CORP 





GULF CANADA RESOURCES LIMITED 
GULF CANADA RESOURCES LiMiTED 
GULF CANADA RESOURCES LlMITED 
GULF CANADA RESOURCES LIMITED 
GULF CANADA RESOURCES LiMïïED 
HARBOUR PETROLEUM COMPANY LiMITED 
HARBOUR PETROLEUM COMPANY LlMITED 
HARBOUR PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED 
HARBOUR PETROLEUM COMPANY LiMITED 
HARBOUR PETROLEUM COMPANY LIMITED 
HCO ENERGY LTD 
HCO ENERGY LTD 
YEAR END 






93 123 1 
90123 1 
941231 











93 123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
921231 




95 123 1 
941231 
931231 
92 123 1 
95 1 130 




92 123 1 
95123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
96123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
HCO ENERGY LTD 
HCO ENERGY LTD 
HEMLO GOLD MMES MC 
HEMLO GOLD MINES MC 
HEMLO GOLD MMES MC 
HEMLO GOLD MMES MC 
HEMLO GOLD MINES INC 
HIGHRDGE EXPLORATION LTD 
HIGHRIDGE EXPLORATION LTD 
HIGHRIDGE EXPLORATION LTD 
HIGHRDGE EXPLORATION LTD 
HlGHRDGE EXPLORATION LTD 
HILLCREST RESOURCES LTD 
HTLLCREST RESOURCES LTD 
HILLCREST RESOURCES LTD 
HILLCREST RESOURCES LTD 
HYCROFT RESOURCES & DEVELOPMENT CORP 
HYCROFT RESOURCES & DEVELOPMENT CORP 
IMPERkL METALS CORPORATION 
IMPERML METALS CORPORATION 
IMPERIAL METALS CORPORATION 
M E R I A L  METALS CORPORATION 
I M P E W  METALS CORPORATiON 
IMPERIAL METALS CORPORATION 
INCO LiMITED 
INCO LMITED 
MTENSITY RESOURCES LTD 
INTENSITY RESOURCES LTD 
INTENSITY RESOURCES LTD 
MTENSITY RESOURCES LTD 
INTENSITY RESOURCES LTD 
INTER-CITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION 
MER-CITY PRODUCCS CORPORATION 
INTER-CITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION 
INTER-CITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION 
INTER-CITY PRODUCTS CORPORATION 
INTERNATIONAL COLIN ENERGY CORPORATION 
NïERNATIONAL COLM ENERGY CORPORATION 
INTERNATIONAL COLIN ENERGY CORPORATION 
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPOFUTION 
INTERNATlONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM CORPORATION 
JORDAN PETROLEUM LTD 
JORDAN PETROLEUM LTD 
JORDAN PETROLEUM LTD 
JORDAN PETROLEUM LTD 
iUNROSS GOLD CORPORATION 
KINROSS GOLD CORPORATION 
KTNROSS GOLD CORPORATION 
KINROSS GOLD CORPORATION 
YEAR END 
94123 1 
93 123 1 
95 123 1 
94123 1 




95 123 1 
941231 












9203 3 1 
96123 1 
961231 
95 123 1 
951231 
941231 




95 123 1 
94 123 1 
931231 
















APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
LAC MMERALS LTD. 
LArDLAW INC 
LAIDLAW iNC 
MAWILLE OIL & GAS LTD 
MANNVILLE OIL & GAS LTD 
MANNVILLE OIL & GAS LTD 
MARK RESOURCES MC 
MARK RESOURCES MC 
MARK RESOURCES ZNC 
MARK RESOüRCES MC 
MARK RESOURCES iNC 
METALL MINMG CORPORATION 
METALL MINTNG CORPORATION 
METALL MTNMG CORPORATION 
MIRAMAR MINMG CORPORATION 
MIRAMAR MrNrNG CORPORATION 
M n n 4 A . R  MMMG CORPORATION 
MIRAMAR MiNiNG CORPORATION 
MORGAN HYDROCARBONS MC 
MORGAN HYDROCARBONS MC 
MORGAN HYDROCARBONS INC 
MORGAN HYDROCARBONS INC 
MORGAN HYDROCARBONS iNC 
MORRISON PETROEUMS LTD 
MORRISON PETROEUMS LTD 
MORRiSON PETROEUMS LTD 
MORRISON PETROEUMS LTD 






NORTH AMERICAN PALLADIUM LTD 
NORTH AMEFUCAN PALLADIUM LTD 
NORTH AMERlCAN PALLADM LTD 
NORTH AMEFUCAN PALLADIUM LTD 
NORTH CANADIAN OILS LiMITED 
NORTH CANADIAN OILS LIMITED 







W A S  LIMITED 
NUMAC ENERGY M C  
OCELOT ENERGY INC 
OCELOT ENERGY MC 








95 123 1 
941231 










95 123 1 








91 123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92123 1 














93 123 1 
93123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
APPEM>IX 2 - List of Sarnple Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
OCELOT ENERGY W C  
OCELOT ENERGY N C  
OGY PETROLEUMS LTD 
OGY PETROLEUMS LTD 
OGY PETROLEUMS LTD 
OGY PETROLEUMS LTD 
OGY PETROLEUMS LTD 
OGY PETROLEUMS LTD 
OMEGA KYDROCARBONS LTD 
OMEGA HYDROCARBONS LTD 
OMEGA HYDROCARBONS LTD 
OMEGA HYDROCARBONS LTD 
ORENDA FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
ORENDA FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
ORENDA FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
ORENDA FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
ORENDA FOREST PRODUCTS LTD 
PALOMA PETROLEUM LTD 
PALOMA PETROLEUM LTD 
PALOMA PETROLEUM LTD 
PALOMA PETROLEUM LTD 
PALOMA PETROLEUM LTD 
PANCANADIAN PETROLEUM LlMITED 
PANCANADMN PETROLEUM LiMITED 
PANCANADIAN PETROLEUM LIMITED 
PANCANADLAN PETROLEUM LIMITED 
PANCANADIAN PETROLEUM LIMITED 
PANCANADIAN PETROLEW LIMITED 
PETROREP RESOURCES LTD 
PETROREP RESOURCES LTD 
PETROREP RESOURCES LTD 
PETROREP RESOURCES LTD 
PETROREP RESOURCES LTD 
PETROSTAR PETROLEUMS MC 
PETROSTAR PETROLEUMS iNC 
PETROSTAR PETROLEUMS INC 
PETROSTAR PETROLEUMS W C  
PHlLIP ENVIRONMENTAL MC 
PHILIP ENVIRONMENTAL INC 
PHILP ENViRONMENTAL iNC 
PHILIP ENVIRONMENTAL MC 
PINNACLE RESOURCES LTD 
PINNACLE RESOURCES LTD. 
PINNACLE RESOURCES LTD. 
PINNACLE RESOURCES LTD. 
PINNACLE RESOURCES LTD. 
PLACER DOME iNC 
POTASH CORP OF SASKATCHEWAN INC 
POTASH CORP OF SASKATCHEWAN INC 
PRAIRIE OIL ROYALTIES COMPANY, LTD 
PRINCETON MTNMG CORPORATION 
YEAFt END 
92 123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 123 1 
961231 
941231 
93 123 1 




9403 3 1 
93033 1 
9203 3 1 
95 1231 
941231 
93 123 1 
91 1231 
921231 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92123 1 
91 123 1 
961231 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
961231 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
921231 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
96\23 1 
95 123 1 
94123 1 





93 123 1 
95 123 1 
APPENDK 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
QUEBECOR PRINTNG ZNC 
QUEBECOR P I U N m G  MC 
QUEBECOR PRMTING MC 
RAM PETROLEUMS LIMITED 
RAM PETROLEUMS LIMITED 
RAM PETROLEUMS LIMITED 
RAM PETROLEUMS LIMITED 
RANCHMEN'S RESOURCES LTû 
RANCHMEN'S RESOURCES LTD 
RANCHMEN'S RESOURCES LTD 
RANCHMEN'S RESOURCES L'ID 
RAYROCK YELLOWKNIFE RESOURCES iNC 
RAYROCK YELLOWKNIFE RESOURCES INC 
RAYROCK YELLOWKNIFE RESOURCES iNC 
RAYROCK YELLOWKMFE RESOURCES MC 
RAYROCK YELLOWKNIFE RESOURCES INC 
RENAISSANCE ENERGY LTD 
RENAISSANCE ENERGY LTD 
RENAISSANCE ENERGY L m  
RENAISSANCE ENERGY LTD 
RENAISSANCE ENERGY LTD 
RiCHMONT MiNES M C  
RICHMONT MMES M C  
RiCHMONT MMES W C  
RICHMONT MINES MC 
RIGEL ENERGY CORPORATION 
RiGEL ENERGY CORPORATION 
RIGEL ENERGY CORPORATION 
RIGEL ENERGY CORPORATION 
RIO ALGOM LIMITED 
RIO ALGOM LMKED 
RIO ALGOM LiMITED 
RIO ALGOM LiMITED 
Ri0 ALGOM LMTED 
ROYAL OAK MINES MC 
ROYAL OAK MMES iNC 
ROYAL OAK MINES INC 
SAXON PETROLEUM INC 
SAXON PETROLEUM INC 
SAXON PETROLEUM MC 
SAXON PETRûLEUM MC 
SAXON PETROLEUM MC 
SCEPTRE RESOURCES L m D  
S C E m  RESOURCES LIMITED 
SCEPTRE RESOURCES LMITED 
SCEPTRE RESOURCES LlMITED 










95 123 1 
941231 






95 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 1231 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
951231 
94123 1 
92 123 1 
91 123 1 
93 123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 t 
92123 1 
91 123 t 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sarnple Companies 
COMPANY NAME 






SONORA GOLD CORP 
SONORA GOLD CORP 
SONORA GOLD CORP 
ST ANDREW GOLDFIELDS LTD 
ST ANDREW GOLDFIELDS LTD 
ST ANDREW GOLDFIELDS LTD 





SUNCOR N C  
TAI ENERGY CORPORATION 
TALISMAN ENERGY INC 
TALISMAN ENERGY MC 
TALISMAN ENERGY MC 
TALISMAN ENERGY INC 
TEMMCO RESOURCES LTD 
TEMINCO RESOURCES LTD 
TEMMCO RESOURCES LTD 
TEMMCO RESOURCES LTD 
TEIE RIMOIL CORPOIUTtON 
THE RIMOIL CORPORATION 
THE RiMOiL CORPORATION 
TIVERTON PETROLEUMS LTD 
TIVERTON PETROLEUMS LTD 
TIVERTON PETROLEUMS Lm 
TiVEiRTON PETROLEUMS LTD 
TIVERTON PETROLEUMS LTD 
TELQNSWEST ENERGY INC 
TRANSWEST ENERGY INC 
TRANSWEST ENERGY iNC 
TRI LiNK RESOURCES LTD 
TRI LINK RESOURCES LTD 
TRI LMK RESOURCES LTD 
ULSTER PETROLEUMS LTD 
üLSTER PETROLEUMS LTD 
ULSTER PETROLEUMS LTD 
ULSTER PETROLEUMS LTD 
ULSTER PETROLEUMS LTD 
UNITED RAYORE GAS LTD 
üNITED RAYORE GAS LTD 
üNITED RAYORE GAS LTD 
UNITED MYORE GAS LTD 







































93 123 1 
96033 1 
941231 











APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
UNITED RAYORE GAS LTD 
VICEROY RESOURCE CORP 
WASCANA ENERGY MC 
WASCANA ENERGY MC 
WASCANA ENERGY MC 
WASCANA ENERGY MC 
WEST FRASER -ER CO LTD 
WESTMM RESOüRCES LIMITED 
WESTMM RESOURCES LMITED 
WESTMM RESOLJRCES LMITED 
WESTMM RESOüRCES LIMITED 
US COMPANIES 
COMPLETE PANELS 1996-1 OR LONGER 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS MC 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS MC 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS INC 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS MC 
ALLIANT TECHSYSTEMS MC 







ALUMINUM CO OF AMERICA 
ALUMINUM CO OF AMERICA 
ALUMDKJM CO OF AMERICA 
ALüMXNUM CO OF AMERICA 
XLUMlNUki CO OF AMERICA 
ALUMINUM CO OF AMERICA 
ALUMINUM CO OF AMERICA 
ATLANTIC RiCHFiELD CO 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
ATLANTIC RICHFIELD CO 
ATLANTIC RiCHFIELD CO 
B F GOODRICH CO 
B F GOODRICH CO 
8 F GOODRICH CO 
B F GOODEUCH CO 
B F GOODRICH CO 
B F GOODRICH CO 
B F GOODFüCH CO 
B F GOODRKH CO 
YEAR END 
96123 1 
9603 3 1 
95 123 1 
941231 







APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 










E 1 DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 
E 1 DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 
E 1 DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 
E 1 DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 
E 1 DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 
E 1 DU PONT DE NEMOURS & CO 










GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
G E N E W  SIGNAL CORP 
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
GENERAL SIGNAL CORP 
HOMESTAKE M r n G  CO 
HOMESTAKE MINING CO 
HOMESTAKE MINING CO 
HOMESTAKE IbfrNmG CO 
HOMESTAKE MMMG CO 
HOMESTAKE MINING CO 
HOMESTAU MiNING CO 
HOMESTAKX MXNlNG CO 
HOMESTAKE MMING CO 
KAISER ALUMINCTM CORPORATION 
KAISER ALUMTNUM CORPORATION 
KAISER ALUMINUM CORPORATION 
KAISER ALUMMUM CORPORATION 
KAISER ALUMINUM CORPORATION 




88 123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
94123 1 
93 123 1 
92123 1 
91 123 1 
901231 
88 123 1 
871231 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
94123 1 





95 123 1 
94 123 1 




89 123 1 
88123 1 
96123 1 
95 123 1 
94123 1 






95 123 1 
94123 1 









93 123 1 
921231 
91 1231 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 










PEGASUS GOLD MC 
PEGASUS GOLD MC 
PEGASUS GOLD iNC 
PEGASUS GOLD INC 
PEGASUS GOLD iNC 
PEGASUS GOLD INC 
PEGASUS GOLD INC 
PEGASUS GOLD MC 
PEGASUS GOLD iNC 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHTLLiPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO 
REYNOLDS METALS CO 
REYNOLDS METALS CO 
REYNOLDS METALS CO 
REYNOLDS METALS CO 
REYNOLDS METALS CO 
REYNOLDS METALS CO 
SL r N D u s m s  INC 
SL MDUSTRIES INC 
SL MDUSTRIES INC 
SL INDUSTRIES INC 
SL m u s T R I E s  INC 
SL INDUSTRIES INC 













94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 1231 
90 123 1 
89 123 1 
88 123 1 
87 123 1 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 
941231 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 1231 
90123 1 
89 123 1 
88 123 1 
961231 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 1231 
90 123 1 
89 123 1 
88 123 1 
87 123 I 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 








96 123 1 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 1231 
901231 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 





































CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CLTRTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CURTISS WRIGHT CORP 
CYPRUS AMAX MMRALS CO 
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO 
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO 
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALS CO 
CYPRUS AMAX MINERALLS CO 





























































FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN INC 
FREEPORT McMORGN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
FREEPORT McMORAN MC 
GENERAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GENERAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GENERAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GENERAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GENiRAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GENERAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GENERAL HOUSEWARES CORP 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO 
HECLA MMWG CO 
HECLA MMMG CO 
HECLA M W G  CO 
HECLA MrNTNG CO 
HECLA M N N G  CO 
HECLA MMMG CO 
HECLA MINING CO 
MTERNATiONAL SPECULTY PRODUCTS MC 
INTERNATIONAL SPECIAL'IY PRODUCI'S INC 
INTERNATIONAL SPECLALTY PRODUCTS iNC 
INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC 
iNTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC 
INTERNATIONAL SPECIALTY PRODUCTS INC 
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO 
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO 
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO 
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO 
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO 
LYONDELL PETROCHEMICAL CO 
M A HANNA CO 
M A HANNA CO 
M A HANNA CO 
MAHANNACO 

















95 123 1 
941231 





95 123 1 
941231 

















95 123 1 
94123 1 










APPENDIX 2 - List of Sarnple Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
M A HANNA CO 
MUELLER WUSTRIES [NC 
MUELLER NDUSTRIES iNC 
MUELLER INDUSTRIES iNC 
MUELLER INDUSTRIES MC 
MUELLER INDUSTRIES MC 
MUELLER NDUSTRIES MC 







PPG NDUSTEüES MC 
PPG iNDUSTRIES MC 
PPG INDUSTRIES MC 
PPG INDUSTRIES M C  
PPG INDUSTRIES INC 
PPG NDUSTRIES iNC 
ROHM & HAAS CO 
ROHM & W S  CO 
ROHM & W S  CO 
ROHM & HAAS CO 
R O M  & HAAS CO 
ROHM & HAAS CO 
SOUTHDOWN M C  
SOUTHDOWN M C  
SOUTHDOWN INC 
SOüTHDOWN M C  
SOUTHDOWN INC 
SOUTHDOWN W C  
TREDEGAR IM)USTRIES MC 
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES MC 
TREDEGAR IM)USTRIES iNC 
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES iNC 
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES M C  
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES INC 
TREDEGAR INDUSTRIES INC 
TRW iNC 





VüLCAN MATERULS CO 
VULCAN MATERLALS CO 
VULCAN MATERLALS CO 
VULCAN M A T E W  CO 
VULCAN MATERIALS CO 
W C A N  MATERTALS CO 
APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
W L C A N  MATERIALS CO 
WLCAN MATEFUALS CO 
WATKMS JOHNSON CO 
WATKMS JOHNSON CO 
WATKMS JOHNSON CO 
WATKMS JOHNSON CO 
WATKINS JOHNSON CO 
WATKMS JOHNSON CO 
YEAR END 
90123 1 




33 123 1 
92123 1 
91 1231 
US COMPANIES, CCONT. 
ADDITiONAL COMPANIES - iNCOMPLETE OR LESS THAN 1996-1 PANELS 
ALBEMARLE CORP 
ALLEGHENY TELEDYNE M C  
ALLIED PRODUCTS CORP 
ALUMAX M C  
AMAX GOLD INC 
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS 
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCI'S 
AMERlCAN HOME PRODUCI'S CORP 
AMERON MTERNATIONAL CORP 
AMERON INTERNATIONAL CORP 
AMERON MTERNATIONAL CORP 
AMERON MTERNATIONAL CORP 






A01 COAL CO 
AOI COAL CO 
A01 COAL CO 
A01 COAL CO 
AOI COAL CO 
A01 COAL CO 
APACHE CORP 
APPLIED POWER INC 
ARC0 CHEMICAL CO 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES INC 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES INC 
ARMSTRONG WORLD INDUSTRIES INC 
ARMSTRONG WORLD BIDUSTRIES MC 
ARVIN iNDUSTRIES INC 
BATTLE MOUNTAIN GOLD CO 
BA'ITLE MOUNTAIN GOLD CO 
BAïTLE MOUNTAIN GOLD CO 
BEMIS CO MC 
BESTFOODS 
BORG WARNER AUTOMOTIVE INC 

APPENDIX 2 - List ofdarnple Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
DDL ELECTRONICS INC 
DDL ELECTRONICS M C  
DDL ELECTRONICS M C  
DDL ELECTRONICS M C  
DDL ELECTRONICS M C  
DOW CHEMICAL CO 
DOW CHEMICAL CO 
DOW CHEMICAL CO 
DOW CHEMICAL CO 









EASTMAN KODAK CO 
EASTMAN KODAK CO 




ECKO GROUP M C  
ECKO GROUP M C  
ECKO GROUP M C  
EDO CORP 
EG&G MC 
EKCO GROUP INC 
EL1 LILLY & CO 
EL1 LILLY & CO 
ETHAL'V ALLEN INTERIORS MC 










































93 123 1 











95 123 1 
941231 













95 123 1 










GENCORP N C  
GENERAL CHEMICAL GROUP M C  





GlANT INDUSTIUES MC 
GiANT DIDUSTRIES INC 
GMNT NDUSTRIES INC 
GOODRICH PETROLEUM CORP 
GRACE ENERGY CORPORATION 
GRACE ENERGY CORPORATION 
GRACE ENERGY CORPORATION 
GUARDSMAN PRODUCTS M C  
GUARDSMAN PRODUCTS M C  
GUARDSMAN PRODUCTS M C  
GUARDSMAN PRODUCTS M C  
GUARDSMAN PRODUCTS M C  
GULF RESOURCES & CWEMICALS CORP 
GULF RESOURCES & CHEMICALS CORP 
GULF RESOURCES & CHEMICALS CORP 
GULF RESOURCES & CHEMICALS CORP 
GULF RESOURCES & CHEMICALS CORP 
GULF USA CORPORATION 
HARLEY DAVDSON 
HARLEY DAWDSON INC 
HARLEY DAVIDSON INC 
HARLEY DAWSON INC 




W C 0  CORP 
HEXCEL CORP 
IMC FERTILIZER GROUP INC 
M C  FERTILIZER GROUP INC 
M C  FERTlLiZER GROUP INC 
IMC FERTILIZER GROUP INC 
MC FERTILIZER GROUP INC 
IMC FERTILIZER GROUP INC 
IMC FERTILIZER GROUP iNC 




































95 123 1 
941231 















APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
MLAND STEEL MDUSTRIES N C  




MTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 
MTERNATIONAL BUSMESS MACHINES CORP 
MTERNATIONAL BUSWESS MACHINES CORP 




KANEB SERVICES MC 
KATY iNDUSTRIES iNC 
KATY INDUSTRIES MC 
KERR MCGEE CORP 
KEYSTONE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES MC 
KFX lNC 
LA Z BOY INC 
LA Z BOY iNC 
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 
LONE STAR MDUSTRIES MC 
LONE STAR INDUSTRIES MC 
LONE STAR TECHNOLOGIES MC 
LOUIS DREYFUS NATüRAL GAS CORP 
LOUIS DREYFUS NATURAL GAS CORP 
LOUIS DREYFUS NATURAL GAS CORP 
LOUIS DREYFUS NATURAL GAS CORP 
LOUMANA PACIFIC CORP 
L W  CORP 
L W  CORP 
L W  CORP 
L W  CORP 
L W  CORP 










W C 0  NC 
W C 0  NC 
MAPCO MC 
MAPCO MC 
MATERIAL SCIENCES CORP 
MATERIAL SCIENCES CORP 
YEAR END 





96 123 1 
951231 
94 123 1 























95 123 1 
941231 








92 123 1 
91 123 1 
90123 1 








APPENDIX 2 - List of Sample Companies 
COMPANY NAME 
OCCiDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP 






ORYX ENERGY CO 
ORYX ENERGY CO 
ORYX ENERGY CO 
ORYX ENERGY CO 
OWENS CORNiNG 
PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC CO 
PACIFIC SCIENTIFIC CO 
PHELPS DODGE CORP 
PHELPS DODGE CORP 
PHELPS DODGE CORP 




PREMARK INTERNATIONAL iNC 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 
PROCTER & GAMBLE CO 
PROCTER & GAMSLE CO 





RMI TITANTUM CO 
ROBERTSON CECO CORP 
ROWAN COS MC 





SMITH INTERNATIONAL MC 
SOLA INTERNATIONAL lNC 





SPS TECHNOLOGIES WC 
SPS TECHNOLOGIES INC 
SPX c0R.P 
YEAR END 
94 123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
91 1231 
90123 1 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 
94123 1 
93 123 1 
92 123 1 
96 123 1 
95 123 1 
94 123 1 





95 123 1 




















95 123 1 
93 123 1 







96 123 1 
94123 1 
961231 












SUN CO INC 
SUNBEAM CORP NEW 
SUNSHINE MRVMG & REFiNING CO 
TENNECO MC 




TESORO PETROLEUM CORP 
TESORO PETROLUEM CORP 
















ULTRAMAR DIAMOM) SHAMROCK CORP 
UNION CARBi.DE CORP 
UNION CARBIDE CORP 
UMON CARBDE CORP 
UNION CARBDE CORP 
CINION CARBDE CORP NEW 
UNION PACIFIC RESOURCES GROUP INC 
US CAN CORP 
W R GRACE & CO 
W R GRACE & CO 
W R GRACE & CO 
W R GRACE & CO DE 
wEnmMN CORP 
WOLVERLNE TUBE ïNC 
WOLVERiNE TUBE ïNC 
































96 123 1 
951231 
941231 

















APPENDIX 2 - List of Sarnple Companies 
# COMPANY NAME 
1462 WOLVERME TUBE M C  
1463 WOLVERINE TUBE MC 
1464 WYNN S MERNATIONAL INC 
1465 WYNN S INTERNATIONAL [NC 
1466 WYNN S INTERNATIONAL iNC 
1467 WYNN S INTERNATIONAL iNC 
YEAR END 
941231 
93 1231 
961231 
95 1231 
94123 1 
93 1231 
